

# SENZA WELFARE?

## Federalismo e diritti di cittadinanza nel modello mediterraneo

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### MIGRATION, WELFARE STATE AND URBAN RESTRUCTURING IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE: GENOA AND LANDSKRONA COMPARED

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# Migration, Welfare State and Urban Restructuring in Northern and Southern Europe: Genoa and Landskrona Compared

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## 1. Introduction

During the past two decades, urban researchers have focused a great deal of attention on the changing nature of the link between immigration and cities.

The consequences of the shift from a manufacturing-based to a service-based economy have become especially evident in the major cities of more developed countries, where the expansion of the service sector has been more strongly fuelled by consumption needs related to the agglomeration of population and economic activities (Castells, 1989). The post-industrial transformation of urban labour markets did not seem to be associated only with the disappearance of traditional manufacturing jobs and/or with an overall upgrading of the occupational structure. On the contrary, new patterns of socioeconomic polarization seemed to emerge between the global elites of well-educated and high-skilled professionals and those who, at the opposite side of the social ladder, are instead employed in new types of low-productivity and low-wage service jobs (Sassen, 1991; Mollenkopf and Castells, 1992). According to this mainstream view, unskilled occupations located in the lower tier of the service sector are thus expected to operate as ‘magnets’ for international migration flows of low-educated workers into more dynamic urban areas and, therefore, to contribute to the consolidation of new forms of occupational segregation along ethnic lines. Especially in the United States, the process of ethnic segmentation of the labour market seemed to be accompanied by the reinforcement of socio-spatial segregation tendencies and by the formation of residential ghettos in certain urban neighbourhoods of biggest cities (Logan, 2000; Wacquant, 2008; Carr and Kutty, 2008)<sup>4</sup>.

This influential ‘demand-side’ account of the changing employment conditions of immigrants in urban labour markets has been widely discussed and criticized both in the USA and in Europe.

On the one hand, North-American scholars have stressed that, although international immigration tends to be more often concentrated in larger cities, changes in the demand-side of labour markets are not able to fully explain the ethnic restructuring of urban social structures (Waldinger and Lapp,

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<sup>4</sup> According to William Julius Wilson, in the USA, the residential separation between the high-skilled and low-skilled ‘components’ of post-industrial labour market tend to be strengthened by the ‘spatial mismatch’ between job opportunities and residential locations for minority individuals, as compared to ‘white’ workers (Wilson, 1996).

1993). Even though well-educated native-born workers tend to be overrepresented in high-ranking occupations in all Western countries, ethnic minorities are characterized by group- and context-specific modes and levels of integration into local labour markets (and into host societies more in general) (e.g., Waters and Jiménez, 2005).

European scholars have instead argued that that social polarization hypothesis is not valid in the in the European context, where post-industrial economic restructuring did not seem to bring about an expansion of low-skilled service jobs equivalent to that experienced in the USA and where the lowest tier of the labour market did not seem to be to the same extent dominated by immigrants (Silver, 1993; Hamnett, 1994; Hamnett, 1996; van der Wusten and Musterd, 1998). In particular, Chris Hamnett pointed how the reasons for this difference between the USA and European countries need to be identified primarily in the greater role played in the latter by welfare state institutions which, according to him, seemed to have largely prevented the emergence of new dualisms within the labour market. Furthermore, Hamnett also underlined how chain migrations have been to a lesser extent driven by labour market needs in Europe compared to the USA and, for this reason, long-term prospects for the creation of an ethnic ‘underclass’ appear to be weaker in European cities than in North-American counterparts: “[...] New York and Los Angeles are perhaps unique in the ease with which is it possible to hire immigrant cheap labour to undertake low-paid consumer service jobs. In part, these workers have no other option. The welfare benefits available in the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Germany and, to a lesser extent, in Britain are simply not available at the same level in the USA. To this extent, occupational polarisation in the USA may be the product of the nature of the welfare state and a high level of immigration from low-wage countries” (Hamnett, 1996:1428)<sup>5</sup>. Hamnett supported the hypothesis about the specificity of urban conditions in the European context by referring to the debate on comparative social policy initiated by Esping Andersen (Esping Andersen, 1990; Esping Andersen, 1999) and by arguing that, despite the neoliberal turn, European welfare states are still able to provide higher levels of decommodification, compared to the ‘residual’ welfare states to which global cities typically ‘belong’.

These assertions have been also questioned by other scholars who have either identified an European ‘form’ of social polarization in the higher levels of unemployment (Burgers, 1996) or argued that that the creation of low-skilled jobs in the private service sector seem to be only delayed in the European countries, compared to the USA, but these occupations tend to be increasingly filled by female immigrants (hence reinforcing a gendered together with an ethnic-based occupational segregation) (Bruegel, 1996).

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<sup>5</sup> Alan Murie has noticed how, in order to emphasize the specificity of European cities, this perspective has long ignored the fact that the UK and the USA are usually located within a same ‘liberal’ welfare regime typology (Murie, 1998).

Still, despite the wide recognition of the need to better operationalize the mediating effect of different institutional settings of welfare systems on urban restructuring processes, this debate has substantially reinforced the widespread conviction that the social composition of the populations of European cities (and, relatedly, the modes of incorporation of immigrants into European urban labour markets) differ significantly from those of North-American ones (Preteceille, 2000; Le Galès, 2002; Häußermann and Haila, 2005). In particular, the low level of residential segregation in European cities has been seen as a distinctive feature which may ensure political stability and inter-ethnic cohesion (Goldsmith, 2000), in the first place because it is expected to inhibit the emergence of tensions and conflicts between ‘local’ constituencies<sup>6</sup>.

In the present paper, we aim at contributing to this debate by raising new theoretical and methodological issues.

In the first place, since this debate started in the mid-1990s, major changes have occurred. International migration has increased everywhere in scale and momentum and, in Europe, former emigration countries (such as South-European ones) have become immigration countries, with immigration rates as high as those of ‘traditional’ immigration countries. Furthermore, the current economic crisis can be reasonably expected to (further) challenge the capacities of European welfare states to promote the integration of immigrants and, therefore, achieve social cohesion.

Secondly, as mentioned before, apart from a few exceptions (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2002; Musterd, 2005), the mediating role of European welfare states on urban restructuring processes has been hitherto generally assumed rather than empirically investigated. Our aim is not so much to challenge the prevailing idea that social cohesion patterns in European cities differ from those in North-American cities as it is to develop this hypothesis by analyzing how European welfare states *differently* influence urban restructuring processes and immigrants’ settlement and labour market integration patterns at the local level.

In the next sections of this paper, we will thus carry out an empirical investigation of the different ways in which urban restructuring and immigrants’ integration processes interacted with each other within two extremely different sub-national contexts: the Italian city of Genoa and the Swedish city of Landskrona. In the second section, we will firstly focus on a specific set of institutional arrangements which characterize the functioning of the Italian and the Swedish welfare systems and which seem to have determined substantial differences in the integration outcomes of immigrants in the two cities at stake. In particular, we will emphasize how the labour market and housing regimes of the two countries played a pivotal role in (pre-)determining certain characteristics of immigration flows and in defining their opportunities for social, occupational and residential integration. In the

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<sup>6</sup> More recently, some studies have nevertheless shown that, also in Europe, residential but also other types of spatial segregation (e.g. school segregation) are beginning to play an important role in affecting voting patterns of native-born citizens (Maxwell, 2010).

third section, we will introduce the case studies in detail and develop a comparison of recent urban, social and demographic developments in Genoa and Landskrona. Finally, discussion and conclusion will follow in the fourth and last section of this paper.

## **2. Migration, Labour Markets and Housing Policies in Sweden and Italy**

As seen before, the relationship between welfare state developments and urban restructuring processes seems to be an under-researched issue which usually tends to be referred to without being subjected to accurate, in-depth analysis. In most of the cases, comparative studies on urban restructuring have in fact merely assumed that local contexts automatically reproduce, in a smaller scale, the patterns of social regulation which operate at the national level. However, the significance of these studies has been questioned especially because they refer to typologies developed by comparative research based on national case studies (e.g. the literature on welfare regimes) which are deemed to not be able to identify and explain differences in patterns of urban restructuring and segregation (Murie, 1998).

By taking into account Genoa and Landskrona, i.e. an Italian and a Swedish city which seem to have followed similar trajectories of urban and demographic development, in this paper we will instead emphasize the specific role played by certain welfare state institutions in mediating the impact, at the local level, of socioeconomic restructuring processes. For the purposes of our comparative analysis, we will focus our attention on three characteristics of the Italian and Swedish welfare systems which, as explained more in detail in the following pages, have significantly influenced urban developments in the two cities at stake:

- the relationship between national patterns of labour market regulation and the processes of economic tertiarization;
- the extent to which the emergence of post-industrial employment structures have constrained or widened the range of employment opportunities for immigrants;
- the ways in which housing policy developments, at the national and local levels, have affected settlement and spatial distribution patterns of immigrants.

It is a well-known fact that the Swedish and the Italian welfare systems are informed by qualitatively-different, institutionalized models of social solidarity (Esping Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Korpi and Palme, 1998). The Swedish social security system is based on a combination of relatively generous basic provisions, which cover all citizens regardless of their position in the labour market, and second-tier earning-related programmes. The Italian social security system is instead segmented into several occupational-based schemes that leave gaps in social protection which have been traditionally covered by family solidarities. These institutional differences in the

social security policies of the two countries are somehow reinforced by the characteristics of their labour market systems and of their service structures in particular.

In Sweden, tertiarization processes have been originally driven by the expansion of a large public sector infrastructure which contributed to an earlier, partial transfer of functions from families to public agencies, as well as to the creation of a large number of welfare state jobs (Bonoli, 2007). Together with 'solidaristic' wage bargaining policies, the availability of decently-paid and secure jobs in the public sector largely prevented the consolidation of divisions in the labour market between sectors characterized by their own production conditions and terms of employment (Swenson, 1991).

In Italy, families still 'internalize' great part of the functions which, in Sweden, have been long furnished by the welfare state and the relative underdevelopment of the social service sector is associated with a more traditional gendered division of labour within households and within society as a whole. Given the lower degree of centralization and coordination of wage-setting mechanisms (e.g., Wallerstein, 2008), the Italian labour market is also marked by a greater segmentation than Swedish one and, accordingly, the sectors which are more dependent upon a supply of low-wage labour historically accounted for larger shares of total employment.

Hence, in Sweden and Italy, welfare states and labour markets have interacted in such a way as to generate different trajectories of post-industrial development which especially diverged in terms of aggregate levels of employment.

What is interesting is that, when the levels of labour market integration of foreign-born individuals are taken into account, the differences between the two countries seem to disappear. In 2008, the employment rate of foreign-born was in fact of 64.3% in Italy and 64.6% in Sweden, while corresponding values for native-born individuals were respectively of 58.7% in the former country and 76.8% in the latter (OECD, 2009:71). The similarity in the level of labour market integration of immigrants hides substantial differences in the characteristics of immigration flows which have targeted the two countries.

Immigration had a much longer history in Sweden than Italy and the earlier transformation of the former from a net emigration to an immigration country is also demonstrated by the presence of a community of Italians (and second-generation immigrants with an Italian background) who (or whose relatives) reached to the country between the 1950s and the 1960s, when borders were still open to labour migration. In 1972, Swedish trade unions obtained a ban on labour migration and, since that year, refugees and asylum seekers have constituted the major component of immigration flows into the country (Schierup, 2006). The ban on labour migration was somehow consistent with the aim of preserving the homogeneity of employment conditions in the labour market while prioritizing a large-scale integration of women into the labour force and, indirectly, allowing an

early consolidation of many of the current ‘women-friendly’ features of the Swedish welfare state (Jordan, 2006). Recent studies have identified the causes for the higher-than-average unemployment and lower-than-average employment rates of foreign-born individuals, recorded from the early 1990s onwards, in the changes occurred in Swedish labour market with the shift from goods-production to high-tech service production. The knowledge-driven transformation of the economic structure seems in fact to have made more difficult for recently-arrived immigrants to find an occupation in the new sectors of employment, where proficiency in the Swedish language and high levels of education are also required (Bäcklund, 2003).

Immigration is a more recent phenomenon in Italy than in Sweden and, given the different type of migration policy regime, based a ‘guest-worker’ system, there are reasons to believe that recent flows have been to a larger extent attracted by endogenous pull-factors, rather than by push-factors from the countries of origin. In fact, the sharp increase in labour migration recorded in the last two decades seems to have been consistent with demand-side needs of specific low-productivity and labour-intensive occupational sectors. In Italy, these occupational sectors have been traditionally characterized by informal conditions of employment but the steady increase in the average educational attainments of native-born workers (especially among the younger cohorts) had, at the same time, the effects of creating a labour shortage and of lessening labour market competition with recently-arrived immigrants (Reyneri, 2003).

The different interactions between the national immigration regimes and the employment structures of the two countries are evident when the sectoral employment patterns of native-born and foreign-born employment is compared (Table 1). As reflected in the Association Index (A)<sup>7</sup>, the Italian labour market is more strongly segregated along ethnic lines than Swedish ones. In Sweden, foreign-born individuals are overrepresented in personal and producer services<sup>8</sup>. In Italy, immigrants tend to be overrepresented in the transformative sector and, to a much larger extent than in Sweden, in the personal service sector. Altogether, these two sectors account for over two-thirds of total foreign-born employment and their relative magnitude implicitly reflects a geographical differentiation in the patterns of labour market integration of immigrants, between industrial district areas (in North-Eastern and Central regions and in Lombardy) and larger urban areas, both in the

<sup>7</sup> Following Charles and Grusky (1995), the Association Index (A) is derived from the following equation:

$$A = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{F_i}{N_i} - \frac{F}{N} \right)^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{F_i}{N_i} - \frac{F}{N} \right)}$$

Where  $F_i$  and  $N_i$  refer to the number of foreign-born and native born individuals in each  $i$ -th sector of employment and  $n$  refers to the number of sectors. The more ethnically segregated a labour market, the higher the value of  $A$ .

<sup>8</sup> For what concerns the latter sector in particular, immigrants are especially concentrated in the cleaning, janitorial and security sectors (data not shown in the table).

	Sweden	Italy
Extractive sector	-0.436	-0.199
Transformative sector	-0.024	0.531
Distributive services	-0.173	-0.291
Producer services	0.244	-0.195
Social services	-0.175	-1.291
Personal services	0.564	1.445
<i>Association Index (A)</i>	1.382	2.308

**Table 1. Employment sectors' parameter estimates of ethnic segregation in the Swedish and Italian labour market (foreign-born : native-born), 2008.**

Note: Positive parameter estimates indicate an overrepresentation of foreign-born individuals in the employment sector while negative parameter estimates indicate an overrepresentation of native-born individuals (see footnote 7).

Source: Statistiska Centralbyrån Register Data and ISTAT-Labour Force Survey.

North and in the South, where personal services predominate (Mingione, 2009). The concentration of foreign-born individuals (especially women) in the personal service sector needs to be primarily explained by the growth in demand for domestic services by Italian households. This has been a consequence of the long-run characteristics of the Italian welfare system, which predominantly concentrates on cash transfers rather than on social service provision, but also of more recent demographic changes related to the ageing of population and to the increasing participation of Italian women in the labour market, which restricted the availability of informal care resources within households (Bettio et al., 2006).

Still, the different possibility for Swedish and Italian households to purchase domestic services has been also influenced by the ways in which this occupational sector has been differently regulated in the two countries. In Sweden, domestic workers were included in the general labour laws already in 1971 and, therefore, wage costs were increased and these jobs were steadily crowded out from the labour market, at the same time as public services were expanding (Plutzer, 2006:213). On the contrary, in Italy the domestic service sector was originally divided along ethnic lines in 1972, by allowing foreign workers to work as domestic workers just on live-in contracts (Sciortino, 2004:118). Although this restriction is no longer valid (since 1986), live-in arrangements still are a prerogative of foreign domestic workers (and especially of female immigrants) who, in fact, tend to accept more restrictive conditions of employment as a first step into the Italian labour market<sup>9</sup>.

Summarizing the discussion so far, the apparent similarity in the level of labour market integration of immigrants into Swedish and Italian labour markets needs to be interpreted as a by-product of

<sup>9</sup> According to INPS (the Italian National Insurance Institution), in 2007 there were 597,281 registered domestic workers, of which 464,033 were foreign born (59,439 men and 404,594 women). However, official statistics largely underestimate the real size of this employment sector in which 'black' employment relations are deemed to be the norm by all the observers.

different post-industrial employment trajectories which especially diverged in terms of development of different components of the service sector. An important role in this respect has been played by the different 'balance' between social and personal services which characterizes the social service structures of the two countries.

Another difference between the welfare systems of the two countries that needs to be separately discussed has to do with the different functioning of their housing policy regimes. While 'migration' policy regimes aim at regulating cross-border movements of population, housing policies can be considered as an important component of the 'immigrant' policy regime, i.e. as part of the set of policies addressing the question of "what to do about immigrants once they are here" (Dell'Olio, 2003:107). The Swedish and Italian housing policy regimes primarily differ with regard to the relative extension of the owner-occupied sector and to the ratio of residential mortgage debt to GDP: in 2008, 80% of Italian households were home-owners but residential mortgage loans only accounted for 19.8% of GDP, while in Sweden the former were 52% of the total and residential mortgages accounted for 60.6% of GDP (Hypostat, 2008). The larger size of owner-occupied sector and lower level of residential mortgage debt in Italy needs to be explained by the fact that, in this country, access to home ownership is to a larger extent dependent upon the possibility to receive financial support from families than in Sweden (Allen et al., 2004).

However, the difference between the housing systems of the two countries which has the most important implications for the settlement patterns of immigrants has to do with the structure of the rental market. The Swedish rental market is in fact organized into an 'unitary' system: this means that differences in tenure types in Sweden are not associated with differences in the rent levels since the municipal housing companies play a price-leading role in the rental market (i.e. rent levels are the same for equivalent private rental dwellings located in the same area) (Kemeny, 1995). On the contrary, the Italian rental market is not only of smaller size than the Swedish one but it is also structured into a 'dualistic' system, i.e. rent levels are different for the residual rent-controlled social housing sector (which account for less than 5% of the housing stock) and the private rental market which, instead, is not subject to any rent-control mechanism. In Italy, in the last two decades, the combined effect of the growth in the owner-occupied sector (accompanied by a previously-unparalleled growth in housing prices), the subsequent restriction of rental sector and the rapid increase of rent levels in the private market has been that of a generalized decline in the affordable segment of the housing stock which especially affected newly-arrived immigrants (Arbaci, 2008).

In the next sections of this paper we will explore the ways in which these institutional features of the Italian and Swedish welfare system have affected the recent urban developments of Genoa and Landskrona.

### **3. Immigration, Welfare State and Urban Restructuring in Genoa and Landskrona**

#### **3.1. An Introduction to the Case Studies**


Basing on the previous discussion, in the following pages of this paper we will develop a comparison of post-industrial urban developments in Genoa and in Landskrona.

Genoa and Landskrona have been selected as case studies because these two cities seem to have followed similar patterns of demographic change. The populations of the two cities grew during the industrialization phase (until the beginning of the 1970s) but they subsequently shrank as a consequence of deindustrialization. More recently (from the early 1990s in Landskrona and from the early 2000s in Genoa), both cities have experienced new demographic gains through international immigration, which caused substantial transformations in the socio-economic and ethnic composition of local populations.

On the other hand, Genoa and Landskrona also show two important differences. The first difference has to do with the different ways in which the Swedish and the Italian welfare states have influenced recent urban and demographic changes in the two cities at stake. The different 'interaction' between welfare state policies and urban restructuring processes in Genoa and Landskrona will be the main object of investigation in the following subsections of this paper. The second difference (which is not considered of primary importance for the purposes of this study) is instead related to the different 'position' of the two cities within the urban hierarchies of their respective countries (as it can be estimated by their different population sizes).

Both cities experienced a considerable population growth until the beginning of the 1970s, when they reached a demographic 'peak'. During this phase, Genoa and Landskrona were important industrial port-cities and population growth was predominantly driven by labour migration. Genoa, one of the corners of the North-Western 'industrial triangle' of Italy (together with Turin and Milan), attracted immigration flows exclusively from the less economically developed Southern Italian regions. In Landskrona, not only internal out-migration from rural areas but also international immigration (from neighbouring countries, i.e. especially from Finland, as well as from Southern-Europe and Yugoslavia) played an important role in local population dynamics. Still, as shown in Figure 1, when population growth reached its peak in the early 1970s, Genoa accounted for about 1.5% of Italian population (equivalent to 816,872 inhabitants in 1971) while Landskrona accounted only for 0.5% of Swedish population (i.e. 37,690 inhabitants in 1970).

During this phase of population growth, in both cities, urban development was strongly influenced by the structural dependence of local economic structures on port-related industrial activities. Genoa was the most important shipyard- and port-city of Italy and its port represented a strategic



**Figure 1. Shares of national populations and population growth (base year 1970 = 100), Genoa and Landskrona, 1860-2000.**

Note: Data for Genoa refer to the first year of each decade (e.g. 1871 for 1870). Data for the year 1940 instead refer to the year 1936.

Source: Statistiska Centralbyrån and ISTAT-National Censuses.

service- and trade-node for the whole North-Western industrial triangle. Landskrona's shipyard (Öresundsvarvet) instead played a relatively less strategic role in Sweden, since it essentially operated as a subsidiary for Göteborg's main shipyard (Götaverken) (Stråth, 1987)

Nevertheless, in both cities, port-activities played an important role in shaping built environments, housing markets and population settlement patterns. Like in other European port-cities, in Genoa and Landskrona, port-related industrial activities spread out in large 'cargo storage areas', due to the limited space available nearby the wharves (Lawton and Lee, 2002). Cargo storage areas were incorporated into functionally-mixed city-centres in which historical monuments coexisted with industrial and commercial activities and with poorly-maintained housing for dock-workers<sup>10</sup>. In the 1960s, when containerization started to become the new standard technology for shipping goods (Hayuth, 1981), the need for space for transit and transshipment activities (as well as for new types of port-related industrial activities) produced a further expansion of cargo storage areas of port-cities.

From the mid-1970 onwards, the economic recession caused by the oil-crises, combined, on the one hand, with the emergence of low-cost competitors in developing countries and, on the other, with overall changes in world market demand, brought about the restructuring (and the subsequent

<sup>10</sup> This pattern of development has been common to most of European port-cities where the agglomeration of economic activities and apartments for dock-workers in the historical city-centres also brought about the concentration of social problems in these areas (Whischermann, 2002).

contraction) of the shipbuilding industry sector in all Western European countries (Cho and Storper, 1986).

As a consequence, many neighbourhoods located in port-areas of European port-cities (which usually were also the city-centres of the latter) lost their former functions and the rise in unemployment among shipyard workers in particular resulted in the abandonment of residential buildings, i.e. in the phenomenon known as ‘urban shrinkage’ (Beauregard, 2009). This has also been the case of Genoa and Landskrona where central areas with vacant dwellings came to become the principal destination for new flows of immigrants in search of affordable housing.

In the following pages of this paper we will thus describe recent demographic changes in Genoa and Landskrona and we will attempt to identify the reasons why, despite the industrial crisis, the two cities benefited from new population inflows. Major attention will be given to the different consequences of these demographic changes for the social composition of the populations of the two cities at stake. In particular, we will analyze:

- the changes in socio-economic and ethnic composition of the populations of the two cities which have occurred after the deindustrialization of the mid-1970s, by especially focusing on the period from the early 1990s onwards (which, as explained more in detail in the following pages, has been crucial, for both cities, in terms of demographic changes);
- the ways in which local labour and housing markets have *differently* acted as ‘magnets’ for immigration flows (the aim is to compare recent developments in the two cities but also the latter with previous historical periods);
- the causes for the emergence of differences between neighbourhoods in socio-demographic characteristics of their residents and, in particular, between city-centres and suburban areas.

For what concerns the case of Genoa, we will especially focus on demographic changes between 1991 and 2001, which are the years for which are available data from the Italian general censuses. The latter data are in fact the most detailed data available on the populations of Italian cities. Despite the more limited availability of equally comparable data for Genoa for more recent years, we will nevertheless provide some information on the more recent urban development in this city. In this way, we will attempt to compare Genoa and Landskrona and to identify the *different* institutional factors which have contributed to generate *similar* patterns of demographic change after deindustrialization.


### 3.2 The case of Landskrona

In Sweden, the shipbuilding industry was one of the sectors hit the hardest by the international economic crises of the 1970s. Accordingly, the governments of those years (a social democrat cabinet until 1977 and different rightwing coalitions between 1976 and 1982) granted a huge amount of public subsidies to this industrial sector. However, due to the continued drop in worldwide demand and subsequent trade losses, it was decided to nationalize the shipbuilding industry by creating a state-owned shareholding company, called Svenska Varv AB (SVAB, founded in 1977). Since nationalization did not prove to be enough to save the shipbuilding industry, in January 1980, the managers of SVAB presented a plan involving the closure of Landskrona's shipyard (Stråth, 1987; Pierre, 1989).

The closure of the shipyard had a tremendous impact on the economic development of Landskrona since this municipality, until then, had been largely dependent upon port-related industrial activities. While, until the 1970s, unemployment rate had constantly been lower in Landskrona than in the rest of the country, from the beginning of the 1980s onwards, the municipality started to record higher-than-average employment rates. As shown in Figure 2, in the mid-to-late 1980s, deindustrialization also resulted in a continued population decline. From the beginning of the 1990s, as consequence of the dramatic recession which hit the whole country, the local labour market situation further deteriorated. What is interesting is that, despite the rise in unemployment, from the end of the 1990s onwards the number of in-migrants always outnumbered the number of out-migrants from the city. In order to explain the apparent contradiction between the growth in the local population and the contemporaneous deterioration of local labour market conditions, it is, in the first place, necessary to take into account changes in national migration regulation which, from the mid-1980s, contributed to the repopulation of the municipality after the phase of urban 'shrinkage'.

From 1985 to 1994, Swedish migration policy was regulated by a "Whole of Sweden Strategy" (WSS, in Swedish: *Hela Sverige strategin*) which cancelled (in 1985) the possibility for asylum-seekers and refugees to choose the Swedish municipality in which they wanted to reside. The aims of this strategy were those of promoting, on the one hand, the repopulation of those municipalities (such as Landskrona) which had suffered from out-migration as a consequence of deindustrialization and, on the other, a fairer distribution of the asylum immigration 'burden' among all geographical areas (Borgegård et al., 1998).

Still, the humanitarian crises connected with the wars in former Yugoslavia, the soaring number of Balkan asylum-seekers who subsequently reached the country but also the growing criticisms



**Figure 2. Demographic developments in Landskrona, 1968-2009: total population, in-migrants and out-migrants.**  
*Source:* Statistics Sweden

towards the lack of attention paid, in the years of the WSS, to local labour market conditions in the hosting municipalities, convinced the central government to reform again migration policy.

From April 1994, refugees were thus allowed again to choose the municipalities in which they wanted to reside. A consequence of this reform was that, in practice, asylum seekers were implicitly encouraged to establish themselves in municipalities in which there were already residents from the same countries and/or with the same ethnic background. This reform had been also inspired by financial considerations since, at the beginning of the 1990s, asylum immigration reached a peak in the country and refugees able to provide for their own housing accommodation required a less expensive assistance from municipalities than those in need of refugee-camp accommodation (Andersson and Solid, 2003:83).

The decision to establish a refugee-camp in the territory of Landskrona, as part of an agreement between the national Migration Board, the municipal council but also Landskronahem, the municipal housing company (Johansson, 2009:39-40), was the main driver for population in the period between 1985 and 1994. The refugee-camp was established in 1985 in the area currently known as Karlslund (in the northern part of the city), where Landskronahem owned buildings with many apartments which had become vacant soon after the closure of the shipyard, as a consequence of out-migration of unemployed shipyard workers. The plan of the municipal housing company was to make these apartments available for the refugees hosted in the camp.

The need to rent these apartments became particularly urgent in the beginning of the 1990s, when municipal housing companies lost their privileged position in the credit market through the removal of previously-existing system of state-sponsored loans (which could cover up to 100% of building costs) (Hedman, 2008). Under the new system, vacant apartments could be regarded by credit

institutions as part of their assets and liabilities. After this reform, municipal housing companies were in practice obliged to compete on equal footing with private housing developers.

However, completely different ‘pull-factors’ contributed to determine population growth in the second half of the 1990s, when Landskrona also came to attract *internal* migration flows of foreign-born citizens living in other parts of the country. For instance, a study by Roger Andersson and Irene Molina showed that, in the year 1994, foreign citizens coming from the northernmost part of Sweden (i.e. the County of Norrbotten) to Landskrona exceeded Swedish citizens’ migration rate from the same area by a factor 1000 (cited in Andersson, 1996:9).

Therefore, for reasons that will be explained below, Landskrona came to become an ‘attractive’ location in which especially individuals with a foreign background and already settled in *other* Swedish municipalities, wanted to and/or could establish themselves.

From 1990 to 2006, the share of foreign-born individuals increased from 14.8% to 28.5% of total population of the municipality and accounted for lion’s share of population growth. As shown in Table 2, during the period in question the number of Swedish-born residents decreased of -7.8% while the number of foreign-born residents increased of +111.5%. The latter increase was especially due to Balkan refugees (coming from former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) who steadily became the second largest ethnic community in the city (after native-born individuals) and who, in 2006, accounted (altogether) for 11.3% of the population, compared to 2.7% in 1990.

The excess of immigration over emigration has been constant from the end of the 1990s onwards but, as mentioned before, this period has been also marked by higher than average unemployment rates, especially among non-native and non-European individuals (i.e. among the ‘newcomers’ to the municipality). As shown in Figure 3, although Landskrona has been always characterized by higher-than-average unemployment rates in the period 1997-2008, it was only after 1998 that unemployment rate among foreign-born and non-European residents became higher in the municipality than in the rest of the country. The increase in unemployment among foreign-born individuals thus occurred at the same time as their number (and share in local population) grew as a consequence of foreign-born immigration from abroad but also from other parts of the country.


Against such a background, it is clear that the local labour market did not operate as a ‘magnet’ for immigration (since labour market conditions remained far from buoyant during the period in question).

The creation of the cross-border metropolitan region of Öresund, in 2001, which came to encompass both the Danish region of Sjælland and the Swedish region of Skåne (in which Landskrona is located), contributed to make the latter more attractive for foreign-born individuals residing in Sweden since it is now possible to reach continental Europe with a twenty-minutes trip

Country of origin	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	Difference
Sweden	30,970	30,144	29,036	28,879	28,554	-2,416
Former Yugoslavia	957	1,799	2,371	2,903	2,984	2,027
Bosnia-Herzegovina	13	688	1,108	1,389	1,520	1,507
Denmark	1,102	1,223	999	1,016	1,272	170
Lebanon	227	451	457	551	691	464
Poland	426	463	453	483	600	174
Finland	703	686	613	609	578	-125
Germany	431	393	383	402	408	-23
Turkey	193	208	227	233	340	147
Iraq	38	69	73	127	299	261
Other countries	1,278	1,619	1,534	1,882	2,660	1,382
<i>Total from foreign countries</i>	5,368	7,599	8,218	9,595	11,352	5,984
<b>Total</b>	36,338	37,713	37,254	38,474	39,906	3,568

**Table 2. Swedish-born and foreign-born individuals in Landskrona (by country of origin), years 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006.**

Source: GeoSweden Database.




**Figure 3. Unemployment rate of total population and of non-European foreign-born individuals, Sweden and Landskrona, 1997-2008.**

Source: Statistiska Centralbyrån.

by train over the newly-built bridge. However, the increase in the number of foreign-born individuals living in Landskrona has been faster in pace and magnitude than elsewhere in the region.

Therefore, in order to explain the reasons for population growth in Landskrona, it is also necessary to identify the exact destination, within the territory of municipality, of the most recent flows of in-



**Figure 4. Patterns of ethnic segregation in Landskrona's residential neighbourhoods, years: 1990 and 2006**

Note: Yellow areas: Areas predominantly inhabited by Swedish-born individuals; Blue areas: Areas predominantly inhabited by foreign-born individuals; Green areas: Ethnically balanced areas.

Source: GeoSweden database.

comers. In this respect, Figure 4 shows the changes in the patterns of ethnic segregation within the municipalities in the years 1990 and 2006. The figures clearly show trend towards an increase in the level of concentration of foreign-born individuals in the historical centre of the city (and, in particular, in the neighbourhoods known as Centrum and Öster), while native-born individuals predominate in the other areas of the municipality. What is interesting is that, unlike ethnically-segregated neighbourhoods of other European cities (and Swedish cities: e.g. Stockholm), Landskrona city-centre is not characterized by a large presence of public housing. Public housing is instead concentrated in the northern inland part of the city where, starting from the second half of the 1960s, Landskronahem built several multi-storey houses in order to accommodate the immigrants who, at that time, moved in the municipality to work in the local industries.

What distinguishes the central area from other parts of Landskrona is not only the presence of poorly-maintained, privately-owned dwellings in old (and sometimes ancient) multi-storey buildings but also a high level of fragmentation of their ownership. There are about 6,000 privately-owned dwellings in Landskrona which belong to about 300 landlords, of which only three are big real estate companies (Markarydsbostäder, Heimstaden and Svenska Hus, which own about 1,000

flats each)<sup>11</sup>. The rest of this housing stock is thus owned by small-owners of a few dwellings and housing ownership tends to be especially fragmented in the very central area of Landskrona ( i.e. the neighbourhoods of Centrum and Öster) in which many buildings were built before the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

When migration flows from former Yugoslavia reached their peak in the country, between the years 1993 and 1995, Landskrona received a large amount of asylum seekers due to the presence of the refugee-camp. For reason, the Swedish Migration Board suggested that Landskrona had to stop to receive more asylum seekers (Dalhammar, 2008). However, the number of foreign-born individuals continued to rise and to concentrate in the central areas of Landskrona whose re-population occurred by the private initiative of small-landlords. In fact, the latter have been autonomously offering their properties (which were poorly-maintained and in need of major renovations) for rent to foreign-born individuals living in other parts of the country. In other circumstances, the social service offices of the surrounding municipalities have been even proposing these privately-owned apartments for rent, located in the city-centre Landskrona, to families with social problems and/or in need of housing residing in their own municipalities (e.g. after an eviction)<sup>12</sup>. On the other hand, the establishment of immigrants in the public housing-dominated neighbourhoods of Landskrona is made difficult by the existence of rather strict requirements for applicants (e.g., Landskronahem requires that refugees already residing in other Swedish municipalities must have a job before being given a public housing flat).

The presence of such a large community of foreign-born individuals in the city-centre has already brought about the concentration of social problems in this area of the city (such as joblessness and long-term welfare dependency). In fact, Landskrona is the municipality with the highest unemployment rate in the Southern region of Skåne and unemployed individuals<sup>13</sup>.

In 2001, Landskronahem purchased three buildings of 103 dwellings from a private estate owner in Juno, a residential complex located in the centre, in order to renovate the apartments and as an attempt to improve housing and living standards in the area (Kristensson, 2006). Meanwhile, public housing buildings of apartments were sold in the more peripheral areas of the city to finance these investments in the city-centre. Furthermore, rent levels were meanwhile reduced in the city-centre since private landlords had previously set rent levels at a slightly higher level than municipal standards (this was possible because, as said before, in Sweden municipal housing companies are

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<sup>11</sup> Information was provided by Anders Eneborg, Development director of AB Landskronahem (04/11/2009, interview).

<sup>12</sup> For example, see “The request to the county administrative board on the clarification of local authorities responsibility for inhabitants who are in need of housing” by Gunlög Stenfelt, the former head of the social service administration of Landskrona: [http://www2.valand.gu.se/spatial\\_expectations/se/texts/Landskrona3.html](http://www2.valand.gu.se/spatial_expectations/se/texts/Landskrona3.html) (in English).

<sup>13</sup> See: ‘Landskrona har länets högsta arbetslöshet’, in Helsingborgs Dagblad, 25/02/2009. Available from: <http://hd.se/landskrona/2009/02/25/landskrona-har-laenets-hoegsta/>

price-leading for the whole rental market). Lastly, new regulations were enacted in order to prevent overcrowding of rental units in the municipality, as it often happened in the city-centre before Landskronahem acquired the flats from private owners. In sum, recent decisions of the municipal housing company seemed to be aimed at enforcing its control over housing dynamics by putting distressed areas located in the city-centre under the ‘aegis’ of public control. However, the difficult coexistence between the native-born population and recently-arrived immigrants has already led to numerous inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts which led to the electoral success of the far-right and xenophobic party of Sverigedemokraterna. For instance, at the municipal elections of 2006, Sverigedemokraterna got 22.3% of the votes (compared to less than 3% in the country as a whole).


### **3.3 The case of Genoa**

In the 1960s Genoa was an industrial port-city city which provided services and intermediate products to the other cities of the North-Western industrial triangle of Italy. Already at that time, a large share of the local labour force was employed in the service sector, namely in activities related to port operations. Genoa’s port was the largest in Italy and served as gateway for raw materials to Turin and Milan (Rodgers, 1958). Port-related activities mostly provided service jobs to the local population, while the industrial sector (i.e. shipbuilding, metallurgy and electro-mechanics) represented the most important employment sector for immigrants from other parts of the country. In Genoa, local industries shared some common features: they were partially or totally state-owned; they were based on capital-intensive investments; their market segments were very highly sensitive to world market fluctuations. In North-Western Italy, the this type of industrial development has been historically associated with a specific social structure dominated by full-time, high-qualified workers, who were employed in large-sized and strongly unionized firms and who did not usually experience long unemployment spells.

At that time, Genoa also showed peculiar demographic characteristics. In fact, Genoa was the first Italian city to experience the changes related to the so-called ‘second demographic transition’, i.e. low fertility rates (which, in this city, were already lower-than-average in the pre-industrial period) and population ageing (the share of individuals above 65 years of age increased from 18.3% in 1985 to 24.9% in 2001<sup>14</sup>). Accordingly, in Genoa population growth could be exclusively achieved through positive migration balances. Since the end of the nineteenth century, the industrial sector operated as the main pull-factor for internal migration flows, which were the sole contributing factor to population growth (in the city but also in the surrounding municipalities). Migration flows

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<sup>14</sup> Corresponding values for Italy were 13.7% in 1985 and 18.3% in 2001 (Source: ISTAT).



**Figure 5. Demographic developments in Genoa, 1958-2009: population, in-migrants, in-migrants from Southern Italy and out-migrants**

*Source:* Municipal register data

originally came from rural areas of Northern Italy but, in a rather short period of time between the 1950s and the 1960s, Southern Italian regions represented the main sending areas (Figure 5). This constant flow of population declined when, between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the economic strategy based on state intervention went into a deep crisis, due to the emergence of new low-cost international competitors in the same markets (i.e. South-Eastern Asian countries in the shipbuilding industry). As part of an emergency restructuring plan, the shipbuilding industry was thus downsized and production was transferred to Trieste (a city located in North-Eastern Italy). Furthermore, Genoa lost its strategic role as the gateway for raw materials and intermediate products to the North-Western industrial triangle when some metallurgical industries were relocated to Southern Italy (in order to encourage economic development in this part of the country). The electro-mechanical sector instead gradually lost importance when Italy interrupted the production of nuclear power. Lastly, the economy of the city was also negatively affected, on the one hand, by the introduction of containerization (due to delays in upgrading of the city port infrastructure) and the by the shift of trade routes from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic (in the 1970s). For this reason, in the 1980s, open unemployment increased and the share of public employment in total employment became steadily larger than in other Northern Italian cities (Petsimeris, 1998). However, this increase in public employment was not associated with an expansion of the health and social service sectors.

On account of the subsequent stop of immigration from Southern Italy, the city started to experience an ageing of its population, which subsequently resulted in lower-than-average activity rates (for example, in 1993, it was of 37.8% compared to 40.4% in Italy<sup>15</sup>). On the other hand, average income was still higher-than-average and also retired (and early-retired) individuals enjoyed better living standards than their Southern counterparts (since Southern Italy never experienced industrialization). It is a well-established fact in the literature on welfare regimes that, in Italy, retirement conditions for workers in large firms and public employees have traditionally been extremely generous, also compared to other Western countries (and also in terms of replacement rates) (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004:42).

At the same time, it is important to remark that the social service sector remained largely underdeveloped and the country is still lacking a national definition of territorially-homogeneous eligibility criteria for elderly care services. These services are in fact implemented at the discretion of local authorities and, even in the municipalities with the highest coverage rates, only a minority of old-age individual receive social care services. This is, for example, the case of Genoa, where the share of elderly receiving any kind of support from the municipality was of 5% in 2005 (a value higher than national average)<sup>16</sup>.

The above-mentioned factors altogether (population ageing, the availability of economic resources and the underdevelopment of social care services) established the conditions for the creation and the subsequent expansion of a market of private care services (i.e. in the domestic service sector). In Genoa, this development ultimately occurred in the 1990s, together with a massive increase in international immigration.

The overrepresentation of immigrant women in the domestic service sector was a distinctive feature of Genoa's labour market already at the beginning of the 1990s, when the share of foreign individuals in the total population was still irrelevant. Until then, the attention of public authorities and media was mostly focused on the growing group of recently-arrived African single men, who were self-employed or in off-the-books employment situations. However, the 1991 census showed that the employment rate of legally-registered Southern-American immigrants was already higher than that native-born individuals (52% compared to 37.7% among Italians, as a share of total population)<sup>17</sup>.

As mentioned before, Southern-Americans were especially concentrated domestic services (see Table 3). Africans and Eastern-Europeans were the ethnic groups which were less integrated into

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<sup>15</sup> Own calculation from the Italian Labour Force Survey of that year (which is the oldest available).

<sup>16</sup> Information provided by the staff of the social service administration of the municipality. It includes individuals receiving home-care and other in-kind services.

<sup>17</sup> When it is not otherwise stated, the analysis of census data reported in this paper have been carried out at Adele Laboratory, ISTAT, Rome.

Sector of employment	Nationality				
	Italy	Africa	Southern America	Europe, USA and Commonwealth	East
Manufacturing and utilities	19.3%	12.4%	10.6%	14.1%	
Construction	6.4%	24.4%	17.5%	5.1%	
Trade	17.6%	26.8%	8.5%	17.7%	
Tourism, Restaurants and Bars	3.5%	10.6%	7.8%	4.6%	
Transports, Communications and Producer Services	24.5%	7.5%	13.9%	25.8%	
Public sector	23.7%	4.4%	6.8%	24.7%	
Other cultural services	4.1%	2.9%	4.0%	4.4%	
Domestic services	1.0%	11.1%	30.9%	3.7%	
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	


**Table 3. Foreign and Italian workers by employment sector in Genoa, 1991.**

Source: ISTAT-National Population census 1991

Sector of employment	Nationality				
	Italy	Africa	Southern America	Europe, USA and Commonwealth	East
Manufacturing and utilities	17.9%	20.4%	12.9%	16.3%	
Construction	7.0%	17.8%	12.4%	6.5%	
Trade	10.7%	12.9%	5.0%	9.2%	
Tourism, Restaurants and Bars	4.5%	6.0%	5.3%	5.7%	
Transports, Communications and Producer Services	24.2%	13.5%	9.4%	20.5%	
Public sector	29.3%	14.3%	13.2%	32.4%	
Other cultural services	5.1%	4.5%	3.8%	6.3%	
Domestic services	1.3%	10.6%	38.0%	3.0%	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	

**Table 4. Foreign and Italian workers by employment sector in Genoa, 2001.**

Source: ISTAT-National population census 2001



**Figure 6. Foreign employed in Genoa, by continent of origin, 1991 and 2001**

*Source:* ISTAT-National population census 1991 and 2001

the labour market, but they somehow ‘compensated’ their lower employment rates (35.4% and 24.8%) with higher percentages of job-seekers than those found among Italians (47.1% and 19.8% compared to 6.4% among native-born individuals).

During the 1990s, the presence of immigrant workers increased in other employment sectors, such as in the construction industry, but they did not seem to be able find occupations in the ‘old’ port-related industrial activities which, meanwhile, regained some competitiveness after the building of the new container hub (in 1992) (Table 4). This trend continued in the following decades when the number of legally-registered-immigrants increased from 16.857 to 42.744 in only nine years (from 2000 to 2008)<sup>18</sup>. In particular, the number of immigrants (especially women) from Latin America grew considerably: this has been especially the case of Ecuadorians, who increased from 3.048 to 14.788 and came to account for one-third of the total immigrant population. This increase was associated with a further concentration of the individuals belonging to this ethnic group in the domestic service sector. In Italy, the gradual ethnicization of this employment sector has been institutionally encouraged by the frequent ‘regularization programmes’ for undocumented immigrants (or ‘amnesties’) carried out by the Italian governments, which have in fact shown a fair degree of tolerance towards domestic workers (Sciortino, 2004:120). This was partly an implicit recognition of important functions played by immigrant women but it was also a way to for


<sup>18</sup> Municipal register data.

encouraging this type of 'private' strategies by Italian household rather than expanding the public service infrastructure.

What is interesting is that, in Genoa, immigrant women have higher fertility rates than Italian ones and, for this reason, and second generation migrants represent a larger share of total population among younger cohorts than among adult or older ones. In some ways, the expansion of employment in the domestic service sector has been thus also associated to a (partial) reversion of the negative demographic trend (although Genoa still shows a lower-than-average fertility rate: 1.1 compared to a national average of 1.3).

Since immigrants occupy the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder in the city, it is extremely difficult for them to find affordable houses. This problem has soon become urgent also for Southern-American women employed in the domestic service sector who, in fact, tend to shift from live-in arrangements to daily work in the same households after a few years of employment.

At the beginning of the 1990s, immigrants already showed a high level of segregation but they were not concentrated, as in other European countries, in the public housing neighbourhoods built during the 'Fordist' phase as a response to internal migration waves. Like in other Mediterranean cities (Allen et al., 2004), in Genoa social housing not only accounts for a small share in the local housing stock (5.4% in 2001) but it also represents an extremely small part of the total stock of dwellings for rent, which are mostly owned by small-owners. Public housing buildings were built in Genoa well before recent international immigration flows. The last ones were in fact built in the 1980s in a few peripheral neighbourhoods located on the hills surrounding the city in order to provide an accommodation to the households who had been evicted from the historical centre around the port. At that time, the city centre of Genoa was typically affected by what Neil Smith (1987) defined as a "rent gap", i.e. by an undervaluation of the housing stock compared to its land value. This high land value area was in fact densely occupied by dilapidated medieval buildings which were very difficult and expensive to renovate. Therefore, for a long time, it had been easier and more convenient for small-owners to rent the apartments at a lower rate than invest in their renovation. The large scale eviction of tenants (mainly represented by low-income or unemployed Italians) from the city centre, and their subsequent transfer to the social housing neighbourhoods built on the hills by the municipality, probably occurred in the 1980s because flats owners thought that a process of gentrification was underway in that area, which would have escalated housing prices. However, the gentrification process was delayed and, at the beginning of the 1990s, the most profitable option was renting, without a contract and in overcrowded conditions, to the 'new' available tenants, i.e. newly-arrived immigrants. This explains, for example, the high level of concentration of African



**Figure 7. Share of foreign residents in Genoa's neighbourhoods, 2001.**

*Source:* ISTAT-National population census 2001

immigrants (who were at that time the largest ethnic group) in 1991 in some areas of the city-centre<sup>19</sup>. Residential segregation became rapidly associated with the spreading of drug dealing and other small criminal activities and the deterioration of the city-centre produced inter-ethnic conflicts which exploded in two nights of riots in 1991. The municipality was thus forced to rapidly approve a regeneration plan for the waterfront which provided incentives to small-owners who decided to renovate their flats. The regeneration plan resulted in the replacement of population in this area of the city since only native-born middle-class professionals were now able to afford to pay the rents<sup>20</sup>. Southern-Americans arrived in Genoa only in the 1990s and they established themselves in former working class neighbourhoods located around the centre, where some apartments had been made vacant by the ageing of the native population (Figure 7). This internal movements of the population contributed to decrease the general level of segregation which nevertheless remains higher than in other Italian cities. Therefore, housing policies did not play an important role in the urban development of Genoa, even if the social housing neighbourhoods built in the 1980s are starting to

<sup>19</sup> In 1991, the segregation index for Africans (.83) was higher than that of other Italian cities (.56) and near to that of blacks in many American cities,

<sup>20</sup> In 2001, the segregation index for Africans decreased to .70.

host small shares of foreign-born households (mostly due to a ‘filtering-up’ process, in which ‘old’ tenants trade their housing units to ‘new’ tenants)<sup>21</sup>.

#### **4. Discussion and Conclusions**

In the 1990s, much of the debate on urban restructuring has considered immigrants as the lowest strata of the urban social ladder of post-industrial cities since it assumed the existence of a relationship between the globalization process and the creation and expansion of new low-skilled and low-wage occupations, which are expected to be undergoing an inevitable process of ethnicization. Under this perspective, polarization trends in the labour market are expected to be reinforced by new patterns of spatial segregation along class and ethnic lines. European scholars have instead argued that, although these factors are at work in all Western countries, welfare states may counteract polarization and segregation tendencies. European cities have been thus normatively proposed as the living example of this possibility, thanks to their ‘welfaristic’ heritage (Häußermann and Haila, 2005).

However, our comparison of Landskrona and Genoa seem to call forth a few remarks in relation to the conclusions reached by the debate on urban restructuring and to the future prospects of urban change in European countries.

Firstly, we believe that the explicative potential of the analysis of the role of institutional factors in shaping urban change has not been fully exploited in current literature. In the USA, it is a well-established fact that political and not only economic cycles influence migration cycles (Hollifield and Hunt, 2006). The same can be reasonably expected to happen in European countries, due to the enduring importance of the national level of regulation (and, above all, of welfare states) in pre-determining the characteristics of immigration flows.

As seen before, the fundamental characteristics of the Swedish immigration policy had been already established at the end of the 1960s while, in Italy, the rapid increase in international immigration is more closely connected to the emergence of specific type of post-industrial economy (which, in turn, seem to have been somehow ‘facilitated’, in the first place, by the delay with which migration policies were introduced in the country and, more recently, by the Italian migration policy regime as such, once it was institutionalized). Accordingly, completely different types of migration flows reached Landskrona and Genoa: humanitarian migration flows in the former city, labour migration flows in the latter.

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<sup>21</sup> In Italy, eligibility to municipal public housing is virtually not restricted to native-born individuals but a barrier for migrants is posed by fact that not many stocks of public housing have been built in the last three decades.

By stressing the pivotal role played institutional factors, we do not aim at underestimating the importance of ethnic networks in affecting immigrant settlement patterns within cities but we just aim at stressing how ethnic networks necessarily act (and are forced to adapt themselves) within a given (and, more often, pre-given) institutional framework of regulation.

In the case of Landskrona, the driving factor of migration flows was the change in migration policy in 1994, which implicitly encouraged asylum-seekers to settle themselves in the municipalities where there were already individuals with the same ethnic background. At the same time, the concentration of immigrants in specific neighbourhoods of the municipality can be instead interpreted as the consequence of a 'lack' of regulation. At the beginning of the 1990s, the city-centre of Landskrona was in fact characterized by the presence of a large housing stock which was at the same time vacant and privately-owned (and whose ownership was extremely fragmented). This is a situation which can be considered anomalous in the Swedish context and, for a long period of time, local authorities did not seem to be able to successfully cope with it.

In Genoa, the growth of the immigration has instead been fuelled by the combination of population ageing and the availability, in the households, of economic resources to be spent for the purchase of private care services whose expansion, however, would have never taken place 'without' the deficiencies of Italian welfare state (Lyon, 2006).

Since welfare state institutions not only allocate resources but they ultimately shape social structures, they always influence the integration patterns of immigrants in urban contexts and different institutional settings of welfare systems will subsequently produce qualitatively different integration outcomes (e.g. by encouraging or discouraging the ethnicization of specific niches in the labour market).

In the same way, national housing policy regimes and, especially, national land policy regimes influence the patterns of residential segregation within a country (e.g. concentration of immigrants in public housing or in privately-rented apartments), although an important role in this regard is also played by locally-specific patterns of urban development. For example, the age and type of the housing stock as well as the spatial distribution and the relative incidence of different tenures may interact with migration flows in such a way as to produce specific integration/segregation outcomes in each city.

Although Sweden and Italy are characterized by extremely different housing policy models (i.e. unitary vis-à-vis dualistic rental market, high vis-à-vis low level of public housing development), Landskrona and Genoa show similar spatial segregation profiles. This is partly due to their common history of port-cities (which explains the presence of a poorly-maintained housing stock in the central neighbourhoods nearby the port-area), whose importance in the urban hierarchies of their

respective countries somehow decayed as a consequence of deindustrialization. Deindustrialization also caused a demographic decline (due to population outflow in Landskrona and to the interruption of population inflows in Genoa) which was related to an increase in housing vacancies.

In Landskrona, local authorities firstly decided to made available a stock of vacant public housing to asylum-seekers but, as seen before, minor changes in the migration policy regimes encouraged internal migration flows of foreign-born individuals from other parts of the country towards the city-centre, where housing was privately-owned and of poor quality. This central area currently suffers from the concentration of various types of social problems (e.g. unemployment, long-term welfare dependency, etc.) but, nowadays, it is difficult for public authorities to relocate foreign-born households to other parts of the city.

In Genoa, the housing integration of immigrants has been exclusively delegated to the unregulated private rental market, although future waves of gentrification will probably bring about a further expulsion of these residents from the central neighbourhoods of the city (and, therefore, their spatial de-concentration).

Housing policy seems thus to play a crucial role not only because it affects residential and segregation patterns as well as inter-ethnic relations, but because it also determines the ways in which migration flows may contribute to urban regeneration in those cities which are declining towards a 'shrinking' pattern. This issue seems to be of great importance since ageing and demographic decline seem to be a feature shared by all European countries (Turok and Mykhnenko, 2007), despite the differences in the institutional characteristics of their welfare systems. Europe has only recently started to perceive itself as an immigration continent, although some European countries already show higher shares of foreign-born residents than Anglo-Saxon ones (Penninx et al., 2006). Still, it is clear that immigration has already become a structural phenomenon in the European context. Since welfare systems respond in different ways to population ageing, they will also differently affect the ways in which the non-native population will contribute to alter current demographic trends and will be ultimately integrated into hosting societies.

While these issues are becoming of a crucial importance, it is also becoming more difficult for public authorities to respond to these challenges. European welfare systems seem in fact to be entering in a new phase of retrenchment since central governments have accepted new financial constraints in order to reduce public debt and cope with the current financial crisis. The risk is that of 'generalization' the Southern European model of migration policies, based on the institutionalized acceptance of an uncontrolled expansion and ethnicization of the low-skilled and low-paid segments of the labour market, with the consequence of further widening social inequalities between the native and non-native groups of the population in all European countries.

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