

**The future of the welfare state: paths of social policy innovation
between constraints and opportunities**

Urbino, 17-19 September 2009

**Labour regimes in European Advanced Economies
Labour markets between care and welfare states**

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Paper presented at the 7th ESPAnet conference 2009
Session: nr. 2B - Paths of innovation of care policies in european welfare states

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Abstract: Employment differentials between countries are mainly due to differences in the engagement of the different “optional” labour force groups (Nickell, 2003), among which women represent today 44% of the EU labour force. The reasons behind this simple fact lie far away in history in the ways modern labour markets have been set-up along the XIX century. Each historical society has in fact produced some rules and devised some reasons on which basis some people *have to* work, while others are *allowed* a life outside of the labour market (women, youth, older people), while *age* and *gender* have represented the main criteria used to discriminate among groups of people to this end. The aim of this paper is, thus, twofold: 1) to use the labour regime approach (Mingione, 1997) to map labour market variety among European advanced economies; 2) to explore the relationship between these different models of labour regimes and the organization of care/reproductive activities by looking at the prevailing patterns of reconciliation between work and childcare duties. The analysis shows the existence of four distinct models of labour regimes which differ systematically with regard to the extent and ways “optional” labour force groups (women, youth, older people) are integrated in paid work through formal labour markets. Second, reconciliation between work and childcare duties also appears to be achieved in distinct prevailing ways in the different labour regime models previously identified, giving rise to different social (fertility) and economic (employment) outcomes.

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1. Introduction

The labour market has been a favoured topic of research both in economics and social sciences. This is quite not surprising if we just consider how in modern societies it has represented both the main mechanism to allocate labour power to productive tasks, and the primary source of social inequality and class formation. Still, the current transformations of work and families and the increasing diffusion of conditions that lie between the categories of employment and unemployment, i.e. atypical jobs are posing challenges to mainstream theories of the labour market.

European countries differ systematically with regard to the degree and ways of incorporation of those which have become in the post-war period the main “optional” labour force groups: women, youth, older people. As a matter of fact, the rise of modern labour markets along the XIX century has gone along with the expulsion of certain activities and groups of people from the legitimate productive sphere. Housework and family work (Saraceno, 1998: 49) represent a great deal of those activities, although they do not cover them all. There are still others which have been normally neglected (education), and even others that have been invented along the course of time (retirement). It follows that certain institutional configurations of the labour market lie on distinct arrangements within the other two spheres of social reproduction (unpaid family work and welfare state support), which give rise to different models of *labour regime* (Mingione, 1997).

Hence, certain labour regimes to exist need for certain care regimes to be established. This has been the case, for example, of the Fordist regime in the previous historical period, which could function properly only where complemented by the male breadwinner model (Crompton, 2006: 6-8)¹. In spite of the fact that the increase in women’s participation and the demographic aging of the population are normally acknowledged among the principle drivers of change, most research has short-sightedly interpreted the current transformations of work overlooking the parallel transformations going on in the reproductive sphere. In fact, the two-fold links existing between the world of labour and households have been by and large unrecognized in international debate and mainstream explanations of employment differentials, which have rather privileged the role of rigid labour market institutions (Bassanini & Duval, 2006; Layard et al., 1991). Still, if we just stop to consider how employment differentials between countries are mainly due to differences in the engagement of the different “optional” labour force groups (Nickell, 2003) – among which women represent today 44% of the EU labour force²- other institutions may well come to our attention: the family and the ways care provisioning is organized within different systems (Esping-Andersen, 2000).

¹ This is of course a simplification as something as *a* Fordist regime or *a* male breadwinner model have never concretely existed, and we should rather refer to their different historical variants.

² In comparison to 11% of youth and 12% of older workers segments (Eurostat, LFS data, 2007)

Consequently, the aim of this work is twofold: 1) to describe labour market variety with regard to the *extent* and *ways* of incorporating optional labour force groups (women, youth and older people); 2) to investigate the interconnections between different models of labour regimes and the ways care/reproductive activities are organized. The paper will be organized as follows: first, it will lay out the conceptual framework guiding this paper. Second, the data and operationalizations used in the analysis will be presented. Third, the different labour regimes model will be described with regard to their main characteristics. Finally, we will present some preliminary findings on the different ways the reconciliation between work and child raising takes places, and is evolving, within the different labour regimes previously described.

2. Conceptual framework

Labour regime

The concept of labour regime has been originally developed by Mingione (1997) within a theoretical framework based on the concept of *embeddedness* to describe the ways in which societies organize themselves to provide and allocate labour within the economic system, and has been defined «as the set of relatively coherent and lasting rules of social life that consent to mobilize labour energies in typical forms» (Mingione, 1997: 158). A labour regime, thus, consists of the set of regulations of work (legal norms, cultural standards, and role expectations) that allow certain for types of employment relations to develop and spread *peacefully* in certain societal contexts. In this sense, the word “typical” is not used here to point at certain kinds of employment relations (standard open-ended full-time employment) in contrast with others (atypical/flexible jobs), but rather refers to what is considered the “normal”, i.e. socially acceptable and most widely spread, form of organization of labour in a certain societies. Accordingly, we could even state that after the (economic and social) crisis of the 70s, a variety of forms of atypical employment (e.g. fixed-term contacts, agency work, new types of self-employment, part-time) are increasingly becoming a typical form of organization of labour in our societies.

The necessity for societies to develop labour regimes stems from the fact that they encounter and must solve a twofold allocation problem: on the one hand labour power must be distributed among activities to allow for production of goods and services, while on the other, the fruits of this labour must be distributed –through private and public expenditure– to the employed and to the legitimately unemployed in order to allow for social reproduction (Offe, 1985). Since in any historical society social reproduction can be achieved essentially in three ways - engagement into paid employment, unpaid family work, welfare state support (Karamessini, 2007) - a labour regime is the result of that coordination which produces a relatively coherent and stable configuration of families’ strategies, life styles, gender division of labour, organization of production, market and state role (Mingione, 1998: 157). The ideal-typical labour regime in the

postwar period has been represented by the (male) life-long full-time employment, plus housewife marriage and welfare state support, which has been variously defined “Fordism”, “male bread-winner” model or “welfare capitalism” according to the relative emphasis put on its three element.

The variety of labour regimes stems precisely from the fact that the organization of wage labour (i.e. what has been traditionally considered “real” labour) has been constructed on the base of a whole set of complementarities with other fields of activity that have by and large remained eclipsed.. The question we try to answer through this approach is, thus: in what ways have productive tasks been assigned differently to different groups within the population across societies? Two dimensions are relevant to answer this question and define a country’s labour regime: 1) the *selection* within the population those which are destined/demanded to enter the labour force and the rules under which this will happen (who works?), and 2) the regulation of the different ways in which the labour power is supplied and disciplined within the employment relation (how do they work?).

Selection

In no society, at least as far as modern history is concerned, *has all the population participated equally in the productive task*. Even today in Europe, in spite of the upward trend in labour force participation, the labour force accounts for only a little more than 50% of the population³.

Each historical society has in fact produced some rules and devised some reasons on which basis some people *have to* work, while others are *allowed* a life outside of the labour market, while *age* and *gender* are the two main characteristics that have been used to discriminate among people to this end (Offe, 1985)⁴. This has been the case, for example, with the “invention” of the full-time *housewife* in the post-war period (Saraceno, 1987). Moreover, a common strategy to all advanced economies in the post-war period has consisted in the quantitative restriction of labour supply through the extension of *compulsory education* and the development of *retirement schemes* which have allowed respectively for a delayed entry into the labour market for the new generations and an anticipated exit for the older ones (Wallerstein, 1996: 25). This set of nowadays rather obvious facts is the *historical* product of that particular settlement which was laid down in Europe during the Golden age. However, the growing tertiarization of economies and the increase of women’s employment are bringing back into the formal economy groups and activities that had been relegated outside of it (Sassen, 2002), e.g. the care of dependant elderly which is increasingly carried out in many countries by female immigrants either in the formal or informal labour market (Bettio et al., 2006).

³ ALFS data (OECD)

⁴ Other widely spread criteria which do not constitute the object of these paper are ethnicity and physical condition.

An important role in influencing the supply of labour has normally been played by the state either through legal regulations to hinder some portion of the population from entering the labour market (e.g. the prohibition of child labour), or through the provision of non market means of subsistence (e.g. retirement insurance, subsidies, unemployment benefits, etc.) that influence the possibility of survival independently from salaried work. Cultural customs have often been incorporated into legal regulations as is in the case of the lower legal retirement age for women in most European countries, especially before recent pensions' reforms. In fact, the average legal minimum age at which women could retire in EU 15 countries has been systematically below men's already from the origins of public pensions schemes in the 60s. However, state policies may be not only *exclusionary* but also aimed at the *inclusion* of a larger portion of the population in waged work. More recently, we are in fact assisting at a shift in the role of the State from exclusionary to inclusionary, as shown by the general emphasis on "activation" and "workfare" policies and by processes of retrenchment of the welfare state (Barbier, 2001). In fact, among inclusion strategies, we may also find negative actions aimed at increasing the dependence of people from earned wages: the reduction of the length and amount of unemployment benefits or the mitigation of the protective function of labour law.

Regulation

Each particular labour regime is the path dependant product of the different ways in which the various phases of capitalist development have occurred across countries. Mingione (1997) points out at the existence of three distinct historical regulative regimes in industrial societies: *extensive regulation* (from the industrial take-off to the First World War), *intensive regulation* (up to the oil crises of the Seventies), and the current *fragmented or flexible regulation*.

The first phase, which corresponds to the period of industrial development in most European countries, has been defined "extensive" because aimed at the horizontal extension of the capitalist way of life through the substitution of the old traditional institutions (rural economies, auto-consumption, handcrafts) with others consistent with the development of industrial wage-earning societies (Polanyi, 1944). It was only through processes of *proletarianization* (for which people come to depend increasingly on the market/salary for a living) and *commodification* (the increase in the number of goods and activities produced for exchange via the market) that the establishment of "wage regimes" was made possible (Castles, 1995:119). Moreover, it is in this period that we can trace the origins of the separation between the productive and reproductive spheres

The basic traits of the subsequent *Fordist model*⁵ were represented by: the centrality of big vertically integrated corporations, the mass production of standardized goods, the diffusion of

⁵ This model was developed and completely spread only in the United States. In fact, likewise the English industrial take-off in the earlier phase, the American model dictated the interpretative categories of this era.

mass consumption and the prevalence of (men's) full time permanent employment. Moreover, the increasing intervention of the state in the economic sphere (Keynesism) represented an essential element to its development. Industrial employment in large corporations –even though not homogenous or numerically prevailing– became thus the general criteria around which society have been organized and labour rights developed.. But Fordism has never been a mere model of organization of production, as rather a broader form of social organization which “deeply” reshaped the life of individuals and households (Gramsci, 1949). Labour regimes during this period were centred on the long-term employment of adult males earning a primary/family income (the so-called breadwinner), supplemented by the secondary income of women and young people and (at least in Europe) by the support of welfare programs. Still, the diffusion of this model across countries and industries has always been unequal both because of the existence of technical limits to its application in some areas of production and sectors and, most of all, its differential “embeddedness” in national contexts. In fact, in many countries the housewife marriage has represented a very limited phenomenon both historically and geographically (Lewis, 1992; Saraceno, 1998; Pederson, 1993). The prevalence of the male breadwinner model over other models in some countries seem thus to be linked essentially to: some historical processes (e.g. the strength of the urban bourgeoisie) (Pfau-Effinger, 2004), a certain level of economic prosperity to allow to free one family member from income-generating duties, and the overall design of welfare state policies. Today, this model has been substantially eroded in advanced economies as societies are demanding a wider participation to the labour market of an increasing share of its members, and especially of women, elderly and young people.

The interpretation of the *third phase* is still hardly clear, inasmuch that it is usually defined only by contrast with the others. The main causes of the crisis of intensive/fordist labour regimes are essentially grounded in three phenomena that are deeply reshaping all advanced economies: 1) the demographic dynamics that is reducing the share of people that contribute actively to the labour market; 2) the increase terziarization/deindustrialization of economies which requires for the contribution of a larger share of the population due to the lower productivity and labour intensive nature of service activities; 3) the growing participation of women in the labour market which has endangered the “gender contract” on which the Fordist model was based. We may observe that as a result employment has become a more heterogeneous condition and the total lack of job is becoming a less frequent situation, while a wide spectrum of employment situations may be more easily encountered.

3. Data and method

Drawing on the work of Mingione (1997), I propose to operationalize labour regimes as the intersection of two dimensions: 1) the different degrees according to which optional labour force groups defined by age and gender are integrated in paid work through the labour market; 2) the prevailing “shape” of employment relations, with particular attention to its distance from the

standard full-time employment relation typical of the previous historical phase of regulation of work (Fordism). Hence, in comparison with Esping-Andersen's concept of de-commodification (1990:48-53), which considers welfare state capacity to de-commodify labour (i.e. guarantee a decent standard of living to individuals and families independently of market participation), we rather look at the end-product of the commodification process: *the degree and the ways in which certain groups of individuals are tied to the labour market in spite of welfare state and family supports*. This choice allows us to address both feminist critique to the ambiguity of Esping Andersen's concept of de-commodification⁶ (Lewis, 1992; 1997; Sainsbury, 1994; Trifiletti, 1999; Walby, 2008) and the apparent paradox represented by social-democratic welfare state which have both the most de-commodifying welfare state and the most commodifying labour markets⁷

To map how labour regimes cluster in European advanced economies, we have thus used a two-stages principal component analysis (PCA) (Di Franco & Marradi, 2003) to construct separate indexes of a country's position on these two dimensions. The indicators have been calculated using the Eurostat Labour force survey data for EU 15 countries, Switzerland and Norway in their evolution in three moments in time (1991, 2000, 2007), even though information was not always available for all countries for all the years. Whenever possible the data missing for a specific year has been substituted with data relative to a following year up to a 5 year period also in consideration of the slow changing nature of the phenomena under investigation.⁸. We have also decided to exclude Luxembourg from the calculation of the indexes because of the peculiarities of its economy (GDP per capita considerably above EU average, high impact of financial activities, etc.) and for the small dimension of its resident population (Capparucci & Naddeo, 2008). Even though The low number of cases considered (16) may present some difficulties with regard to the presence of measurements errors and the generalization of the findings. The decision not to extend in any case the analysis to other European economies (for example the new members of the EU 25) has resulted from considerations on the limited availability of reliable and homogenous data for some of the indicators considered, and because of the heterogeneity of the historical and current processes at work in the evolutions of labour regimes which would have widened too much the scope of this analysis.

The *selection dimension* measures the extent to which the population is integrated in the labour market, and in particular of those which are considered "optional" labour force (women, youths, older people). To measure this dimension we have used *age and gender specific employment rates*. In its simplicity, this measure provides us with information on the degree of commodification/proletarianization of the population (Polanyi, 1944). The analysis thereby

⁶ According to many feminist scholars, in spite of the fact that de-commodification (from labour market dependence to state support) has been considered in modern times as the foremost principle of equity, as in Esping-Andersen seminal work(1990), the commodification of women labour (from domestic to wage labour) is normally regarded as a step forward on the road toward gender equality.

⁷ In fact in spite of their generous welfare states, Nordic countries have the highest employment rates in Europe just slightly below 80%.

⁸ In particular, we have used data relative to the year 1995 for Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and the year 1996 for Switzerland instead of 1991.

identifies a component characterized by the high participation and employment of all the labour force “marginal” groups on the positive pole, and by their low engagement in the labour market on the negative one⁹.

[Table 1 about here]

The prevailing form of regulation of employment relations has been measured instead constructing an *index of de-standardization* of the labour regime that considers the quota of self-employment, temporary and part-time employment over their “opposite” work arrangements (see appendix). The reasons we have decided to include *all* three segments is that here we are not concerned with their different degrees of social vulnerability or personal desirability, as rather our aim is to describe the extent to which current labour regimes are “de-standardized”, *that is distant/dissimilar in their prevailing employment condition from the typical full-time life-long labour relation which has represented the key parameter of regulation in the previous historical phase (Fordism)*, and which form of de-standardization of employment is prevailing in certain national economies. Some difficulties have been encountered in the measurement of this dimension due to the paucity of indicators on non-standard employment and to limits of comparability of the available data due to differences in national definitions of different employment relations segment (e.g. part-time) and of internal heterogeneity of the work-arrangements included under the same category (e.g. temporary work). To try to break-down somehow and have a clearer pictures of these different employment categories, we have also included the OECD employment protection indicator and the share of employment in industrial and service activities. The component thereby identified¹⁰ describes the different “shapes” according to which labour is regulated: the positive and the negative poles describe different forms of de-standardization, while its centre is characterized by the prevalence of standard employment relations. In particular, high values correspond to the prominence of self and temporary work and industrial activities, while low values point at the major importance of part-time and service employment.

[Table 2 about here]

Plotting each country component score on the two dimension, we find four distinct patterns of labour market integration:

- 1) highly selective, highly de-standardized countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain);
- 2) highly selective, low de-standardized countries (Belgium, France);
- 3) averagely selective, low de-standardized countries (Germany, Ireland, Finland and Austria);
- 4) low selective, highly de-standardized countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom).

⁹ This first component reproduces 74% of the common variance, and all the variables show significant correlations to it (component loading ≥ 0.7)

¹⁰ This second component reproduces 53% of the common variance¹⁰, and all the variables give a significant and well-balanced contribution to the construction of the index

[Fig. 1 about here]

4. Labour regimes models

The four models identified in the previous section show marked differences with regard to: 1) the extent the population is engaged in gainful employment (high/low selectivity), and 2) the relative importance of different forms of regulations (standard/non-standard employment). Of these four models, two of them appear to be highly selective (familialistic and conservative), while the other two show more inclusionary labour markets (half-time and, increasingly, Fordist regimes). On the side of regulations, standard employment (permanent full-time contracts) is far more common in conservative and Fordist countries, while non-standard work represents an important element of the employment system of both familialistic and half-time regimes. The combination of their different characteristics gives rise to the four models as shown in table 1.

[Table 3 about here]

Yet, countries' labour regimes do not only differ in degree but also *qualitatively* with regard both to the specific groups which are excluded/included from the labour force, and the ways their labour markets are de-standardized. So, even if selectivity is high both in familialistic and conservative regimes, it is respectively aimed towards women and youth in the former, and extreme-age groups in the latter. Likewise, the prominence of different kinds of non-standard employment characterizes familialistic and half-time countries. In the former, a great deal of work has traditionally taken place outside of the labour market (in self-employment, small firms, irregular activities), while more recently the importance of temporary and new "pseudo" self-employment has experienced significant increases. In the latter, non-standard employment consists essentially of part-time work in public/private service activities.

Familialistic regimes: Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal

The fact that in these countries «family-centred welfare systems, family-biased production systems and a family oriented value system go hand in hand» (Flaquer, 2000:12) has deeply moulded the characteristics of this model of labour regimes. The distinguishing features of this model -which can be typically encountered in Southern European countries- are in fact represented by: 1) the limited engagement of the population in salaried employment, and 2) a traditionally high diffusion of forms of non-standard and informal work. These labour markets are the most selective in Europe with regard to all optional labour force groups, and especially toward youth and women. On the side of regulations, this model characterizes in turn for the *limited presence of individuals fully dependent on salaried income for their living (partial proletarianization)*, i.e.

a great deal of work takes place outside formal labour markets (Mingione, 1995; De Sousa Santos, 1986). In fact, in spite of the fact that these countries are normally depicted as having very rigid labour markets, the actual diffusion of standard forms of employment (open-ended full-time contracts) has always been, and continues to be today (56.1%), rather limited. In turn, forms of non-standard employment relations (self-employment) and irregular activities (in small family businesses and underground activities) have traditionally represented widespread forms of work in these countries, while more recently temporary and new “pseudo” self-employment contracts have shown considerable upward trends. The combination of strict regulation (and generous provisions) and limited diffusion of standard employment gives rise to very dual labour markets. This problem has been further enhanced by recent reforms which have characteristically acted only “at the margin”: rising restrictions to the use of atypical employment, but leaving the institutional settings of permanent employment practically untouched.

Conservative regimes: France, Belgium

Conservative labour regimes show both strongly selective labour markets and very high proportions of standard employment (regular full-time permanent jobs) (62.1%). *Age represents the main criteria use to discriminate among potential labour force groups, while the relevance of gender has been historically less relevant.* The highly selective nature of these labour regimes is essentially aimed at extreme-age groups with employment levels of youth and older people that are among the lowest in Europe (at least 15% below the other labour regimes). Different evolutions appear, however, to characterize these two groups: whereas youth employment has been in constant decrease from the beginning of the 80s and doesn't appear to show any sign of recovery; older people's employment has experienced a moderate growth in the last decade¹¹. Conversely, women's engagement in the labour market has been historically high (Eck, 1996; Sohn, 1996) and – similarly to SE countries – following a male full-time work model. The age bias of this labour regime, however, seems also to affect women, as younger and older females are between 10 and 20% are less employed than European average. This employment model seem thus to be based on a division of work among generations with *only one generation – of men and women - working at a time (25-55 years old)* (Elbaum & Marchand, 1993). Extreme age groups are instead supposed to be cared by public intervention either through the extension of the education period (youths) or the reduction of retirement age or of the working week (older workers) (Anxo et al., 2005; Moncel, 2006). On the side of regulations, these labour markets are also characterized by the relatively limited diffusion of non-standard works and strong regulations with regard to both regular and

¹¹ In the period between 1983 and 2007, the employment rate of youth (15-24 years old) have decreased around 6.0 % and 10 % in Belgium and France respectively. Conversely, the employment of older people's has experienced a severe reduction during the 80s (-14% and 9% in Belgium and France respectively) but has started to grow again after 1991 (+9% and 4% respectively), even though it remains below its initial level.

temporary employment. These characteristics have also shown a considerable degree of persistence over time as reforms have often been followed by countervailing measures or only produced a sort of “putting old wines in new barrels” effect.

Fordist regimes: Germany, Austria, Ireland and Finland

At first glance this group of countries strikes as a strangely assorted mix: made up of two continental, an Anglo-Saxon and a Northern European state, different welfare regimes (corporatist, liberal¹², universal), two high growth economies (Austria and Ireland) and two countries which have experimented severe economic downturns following some “exceptional” events at the beginning of the 90s (the German reunification and the Great Depression in Finland). Their actual belonging to the same cluster appears to be in fact only a *transitory* phenomena driven by their sharing today some common features: 1) a very similar structure of employment by sector with a consistent share of industrial employment in big-size enterprises and underdeveloped service sectors; 2) the prevalence of standard and, up to recently, full-time, open-ended contracts; 3) the prominent role played by labour market organizations (unions and employers’ associations) in shaping the overall political economy of these countries (*labour-inclusive associational governance*) (Hassel, 2001); 4) a relatively even, and growing, involvement of all population groups in paid work; 5) the privileged position of youths and the growing integration of women in the labour market.

Different starting points and evolutionary dynamics seem however to characterize Germany and Austria on one side, and Ireland and Finland on the other. The first two countries represent ideal-typical cases of a clear distinctive model that has received much attention in scholarly literature as also shown by the number of labels used to indicated it¹³. Conversely, Ireland and Finland are among two of the most famous labour market *outliers* cited in the literature¹⁴, insofar that a lively debate has often spurred around the nature of their supposed “exceptionalism” (Daly, 2000, Evans et al., 1999). These four countries appear also to be changing in different ways: whether in Austria and Germany the most relevant change has concerned the increase of non-standard employment relations, Finland and Ireland are essentially shifting along the selection dimension. In fact, the growth of atypical employment, and in particular of part-time work, appears to be moving Germany and Austria closer to the more inclusive labour regimes (half-time regimes), from which however still differ because of the

¹² Ireland is normally classified as a liberal welfare state since it shares the feature of a low level of employment protection, but it should be better described as an *hybrid* welfare regime since it also shares a number of characteristics of other regimes’ types: the active labour market policy and breadwinner arrangement characteristic of corporatist states, and the familial character of SE regimes. (Muffels & Luijkx, 2004)

¹³ “Organized capitalisms” (Lash & Urry, 1984) “coordinated market economies” (Hall & Soskice, 2001), “cooperative managerial capitalism” (Chandler, 1990) and “social market economies” (Albert, 1991).

¹⁴ The other famous case is represented by Portugal.

limited development of service activities. On the other side, Finland and Ireland show the smallest share in Europe of atypical employment (below 40%) which has remained stable at its level of the mid 90s. The major change in these countries' labour regimes has concerned the increased participation of the different groups of population in paid work (mostly with regard to older people in Finland and women in Ireland). The labour regime of these two countries continues nevertheless to configure a distinct model of their own.

Half-time regimes: Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

The fact that within these group of countries, we find both liberal (United Kingdom) and universal welfare states (Scandinavian countries) (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999) should not be considered a contradiction, since in our classification of labour regimes we are not taking into account any dimension of welfare provisioning or welfare's state capacity to de-commodify labour. These countries belong to the same cluster because they have found the same "solution" for their labour markets, even though they may split with regard to the way their welfare states are organized. The distinguishing feature of this labour regime is represented by the high share of part-time and service employment (74.7%) and (29.6%) and the highly inclusive nature of their labour markets with regard to all the groups considered (women, youth and older people)¹⁵. Half-time labour regimes are, in fact, uniformly characterized both by the radical character of processes of proletarianization (the degree according to which labour is exchanged through formal labour markets) (89% of dependent employment), and the prominence of "reduced-time" working life -in particular with regard to women- from which stems the highly de-standardized nature of their labour market.

In these group of countries the integration of women in the labour market occurs essentially through part-time work (49% of female employment) either in public social services (Scandinavian countries) or in low-paid jobs in personal services (United Kingdom). In fact, high and relatively continuous employment of women in these countries is achieved in rather different ways according to the (or lack of) role of public provisions. In Scandinavian countries, high women employment has resulted from the positive relationship between women's labour force participation and the strong commitment of their welfare state toward the delivery of a wide range of services: the rising participation of women has fed demands for social services that both facilitated women's entrance in the labour force and provided them with employment opportunities. Inequalities in these countries' labour markets doesn't reside in uneven access to employment as in other labour regimes (SE, industrial) as rather in the risk of forms of horizontal segregation. Conversely, the United Kingdom – and to certain extent in Switzerland- it is the lack of affordable childcare facilities together with a high demand for part-time work and large service

¹⁵ We have a hunch that is toward immigrant workers that selectivity is rather played within this kind of labour regime.

sectors that drives women into part-time employment. (Daly, 2000: 503-504). Different factors have, thus, lead to similar outcomes although with relevant differences in the quality of part-time work between these two models. The Scandinavian model delivers better quality and more integrated forms of part-time work in terms of the occupational profiles, hourly earnings, protections, while the situation in the United Kingdom is characterized by the predominance of lower quality part-time positions

5. Patterns of work-family reconciliation in different labour regimes

In this paragraph, we present some preliminary findings on the evolution of reconciliation practices within the different labour regimes previously described. The underlying assumptions implicit in the concept of reconciliation are that of role incompatibility between labour force participation and family life, and that women – which are everywhere the principle providers of care - will adjust one to accommodate for the other. In fact, there is evidence that women adjust both factors, and that the extent and the ways in which this happens varies considerable across countries (Vos, 2009). This discussion will be carried out focusing only on care for children and not on other groups of dependant people (e.g. elderly care) since: 1) numerous studies have shown the presence of a negative effect of children on women’s labour force involvement (Gornick et al., 1997; Uunk et al., 2005; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002); 2) the magnitude of this effect varies greatly across countries; 3) there is a larger availability of detailed and comparable data.

One of the issue in today’s labour market debate in fact concerns the need for reconciliation policies to encourage a higher participation of women in the labour market. This discussion has been often reduced to the dilemma between the provisioning of reconciliation *in the market* (e.g. trough part-time work) or *outside the market* (e.g. trough public childcare). In reality, these are only two of the options of a wider range of possibilities: one or both parents may scale back their work effort for a certain period of time with or without compensation, a more equal division of duties within the households, care can be commodified in the formal or informal labour market (Bettio & Plantega, 2004; Lewis, 2008). Further ways are also represented by intergenerational solidarity, immigrant care work, and decreasing fertility which, as we will see, represent widespread ways in Mediterranean countries. In sum, care regimes can be organized around different principle according to the main subject which is considered responsible for it (state, firm, households, women) and the concrete ways in which it is carried out.

The variables considered here (table 2) do not obviously pretend to exhaust the possible options available to women to accommodate work and child raising duties. Other aspects which have not been considered here are also influential: the length of holidays from school, the availability of flexible working-time arrangement beyond part-time jobs, the characteristics of leave policies. Still, we believe that the indicators selected represent a “basic line” from which both to judge the differential role of public/private childcare provisioning (expenditure on childcare policies/part-time), and the degree according to which childcare is considered either a

private matter of the family (fertility rates, support of kinship and other informal networks, part-time work, expenditure on family policies), or a subject of concern of the state (childcare coverage for children under 3, hours of formal care, expenditure on childcare policies).

Table 2: Reconciliation patterns in different labour regimes

	<i>Familialistic</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Fordist</i>	<i>Half-time</i>
Female employment rate (25-54)	65.23	74.25	75.73	79.92
Total Fertility rates (2007)	1.37	1.98	1.65	1.77
% of mothers (20-49) working full-time relying on relatives/neighbours/friends as main childcare	33.5	24.5	12.9	9.4
Expenditure in family policies as % GDP	1.3	2.3	2.9	2.3
Expenditure on childcare and pre-primary as % GDP	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.7
Childcare coverage for children <3 (2003)	10.5	36.5	12.3	38.6
Weekly hours in formal care for children > 3 to compulsory school age (2006)	26.2	28.1	29.2	25.1
Female part-time work rate	18.25	35.35	34.18	48.93
Share of female involuntary part-time work (2007)	38.15	22.85	17.43	12.83

Sources: Female employment rate, EU LFS survey, 2007. Total fertility rate from Eurostat demographic indicators dataset refers to 2006 Expenditure in family policies as % GDP, Eurostat ESSPROSS database, 2006. Expenditure on childcare and pre-primary school, OECD family database, 2005. Childcare coverage from Plantega & Remery (2005) refers to 2003. Mothers of children < 14 years working full-time and using relatives/ neighbours/friends as main type of childcare from EU LFS ad hoc module on 'reconciliation between work and family life', 2005 (data missing for CH e IE). Weekly hours in formal care from EU-SILC refers to 2006. Female part-time and involuntary part-time rate from the EU LFS refer to 2007.

The care system of *familialistic regimes* appears to be particularly under stress to change due both to women's increased participation in the labour market and the extension of the work-life of the older generations, which still represent a traditional source of childcare provision. Given the lack of part-time opportunities and the long-hours culture typical of these countries, SE women are faced with very dichotomous choice between full-time or no work (Daly, 2000). Moreover, the enforcement of the subsidiarity principle and the corporatist design of their welfare states explain the striking low share of expenditure both on family and childcare measure. On the demand side, cultural norms about motherhood and the "proper way" to care about (young) children may also limit the use of –anyway scarce - formal care (Plantega & Remery, 2005). In spite of all these institutional obstacles, a "silent revolution" in female labour force supply is nevertheless taking place through the growing engagement of women in paid work, which will unlikely be reversed in the future. Childrearing within these labour regime remains a private matter of the nuclear or extended family, while the growth of part-time doesn't appear to represent a real alternative also considering its largely involuntary nature. Women in these group

of countries increasingly choose to balance work and care duties reducing the second term of this equation: limiting the number of children (*births strike*). There is also some evidence – although we lack data on this aspect - of a relevant role played by immigrant care providers in the formal or informal markets (Bettio et al., 2006; Simonazzi, 2009)

In *conservative regimes*, women's have been particularly burdened by tiring double shift given the high and full-time nature of their labour force engagement. Child raising is still considered a responsibility of the family as in SE countries – as also shown by the use of informal networks – but the state has nevertheless been traditionally supportive of women's employment (high expenditure on childcare). Formal childcare provisioning is – in spite of its downward trend (Lewis, 2008)- among the highest both with regard to availability and opening hours. Policies within this labour regime have been traditionally aimed at enhancing the set of possibility available to women to choose freely between engaging in paid work or staying at home, rather than merely pushing them into paid work. Recent evolutions seem to point at a shift toward a different mix of instruments (allowances, leave policies) and at an increasing role of part-time work. Interestingly, this is the only group of countries where fertility rates have experience a certain upward trend in the last decade (+0,32).

The system of care provisioning of *Fordist regimes* have been traditionally similar to that of SE regimes with a strong reliance on the unpaid work of women within the household. Yet, a different form of familialism appears to characterize these countries since although they are not willing to supplant family-based caring, they are quite generous in supporting it (as shown by their comparatively high level of family expenditure but low amount of resources destined to childcare)¹⁶. This makes for practices like half-day childcare facilities (but also generous and long parental leaves). This also point at the difference existing with conservative regime: whereas in these countries extensive childcare facilities are conceived to facilitate mothers going to work, in Fordist regimes their purpose is to help mothers bringing up children. Mothers in these countries can work only to the extent that the availability of part-time work and public services allow it; their involvement in the labour market has been typically discontinuous and characterized by short hours (see the prominent role of the new mini/marginal jobs). The evolutions of their care regime, seem to point to a growing importance of *part-time work* for women to reconcile work and family duties.

In *half-time regimes* part-time work represents clearly *the way* of reconciling work and family life. Two different patterns of reconciliation may however be encountered within these group of countries according to the extent of public support to formal care. On one side, we find those countries (UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands) where publicly funded services are relatively scarce, but where children are nevertheless cared for in privately funded services (35% of children<3). The high share of part-time employment in these countries is the combined result of the

¹⁶ By contrast in SE regimes, the state only implicitly supports the caring function of the family «the state does not take on the responsibility of guaranteeing a family wage. It merely allows nuclear families to pursue strategies to ensure that at least one member has a good protected job (Trifiletti, 1999: 53).

spontaneous process of entry of married women in the labour force and the absence of facilities and support for childcare (Visser, 2002). On the other side, there are those countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway) where the state has provided extensive support to women's employment both through extensive childcare provision (42% of children <3) – framed as a universal right¹⁷ (Plantega & Remery, 2005) - and part-time employment opportunities in public social services.

6. Conclusions

When we approach the analysis of data, one of the first operations that we carry out is to run cross-tabulation for gender and age because we are well aware that they represent important sources of variations of almost any phenomena in historical societies. Still, when many scholars approach the analysis of the labour market - at least a certain kind of analysis (e.g. studies on the determinants of unemployment) - oddly enough, they seem to forget about this. Through the labour regime approach, I wish to have shown how gender and age have represented key parameters in the configuration of different national employment systems.

In this work, I have defined labour regimes as the intersection of two dimensions: their degree of selectivity toward labour force groups defined by age and gender; and the distance/proximity of the prevailing forms of regulation from the standard full-time employment criteria which has constituted the criteria – even where numerically limited – of the previous historical phase of regulation. *The four model of labour regimes identified differ systematically in the degree and ways of incorporation of those which have become in the post-war period the main “optional” labour force groups (women, youth, older, people).* Selectivity is high in SE regimes and low in inclusive labour regimes, while the other two groups lie somewhere in the middle but with marked differences with regard to the groups that are left out of the labour force: extreme age groups in conservative regimes and (but increasingly less so) women and older people in industrial countries. Different forms of regulations also characterize these different models. Both inclusive and SE regimes have highly de-standardized labour markets although in clearly different ways: essentially through part-time work in the former group of countries, and through a mix of self-employment – and also new “pseudo” self-employment - temporary work and irregular activities in the latter model. The prominence of standard employment relations characterizes conversely conservative and industrial models but with different dynamics. Whereas the considerable growth of part-time is moving industrial countries closer to the cluster of more inclusive countries, regulations in conservative regime show a high degree of stability.

In the last part of this work, I have tried to explore the links that exist between labour and care regimes. I have done this by looking at the evolutions of reconciliation practices within the different groups of labour regimes previously identified. Each group of countries seems to privilege a different mix according both to standing institutional arrangements and prevailing

¹⁷ With the exception of Norway (which characterizes among Scandinavian countries as the more “male breadwinner” oriented) (Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002)

norms concerning gender roles on the care of children. Also, here, in fact the balance between work and childcare duties appears to be achieved in distinct prevailing ways: reducing fertility and resorting to informal care (either provided by the extended family or migrant workers) in SE regimes; through formal childcare in conservative regimes, increasingly through part-time work in industrial labour regimes, and through a combination of formal childcare and part-time options in the more inclusive regimes. These distinct patterns seem also to produce different social and economic outcomes. Both fertility rates and the employment of women are low in SE regimes and high in inclusive labour regimes, while the other two regimes present more mixed results appearing somewhat more favourable towards fertility (conservative) or (part-time) employment (industrial).

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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Labour regime's clusters 2007.




Table 1: Selection dimension component loadings and component score coefficients

	Component Loadings	Component score coefficients
Employment rates 15-19 years old males	0,89	0,17
Employment rates 20-24 years old males	0,95	0,18
Employment rates 55-64 years old males	0,73	0,14
Employment rates 15-19 years old females	0,95	0,18
Employment rates 20-24 years old females	0,97	0,18
Employment rates 25-54 years old females	0,81	0,15
Employment rates 55-64 years old females	0,76	0,14

Table 2: De-standardization dimension component loading and component score coefficients.

	Component Loadings	Component Score Coefficients
Employment in Services (% total employment)	-0.92	-0.29
Part-time/full time employment	-0.72	-0.23
Employment in Industry (% total employment)	0.82	0.26
EPL	0.64	0.20
Self-employment/dependant employment	0.63	0.20
Temporary/ permanent employment	0.57	0.18

Note: Estimates relative to the first component calculated by principle component method; the component has an eigenvalue of 3.2.

Table 3: Labour regimes' combination of selectivity and de-standarization

		Selectivity	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
De-standardization	<i>High</i>	Familialistic	Half-time
	<i>Low</i>	Conservative	Fordist