

The future of the welfare state: paths of social policy innovation between constraints and opportunities

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Education and labour market participation of young migrants: Challenges and policy

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Introduction

The title of this paper raises a number of problems. The intention to study how young migrants fare in schools and in the labour market in European countries presupposes that this group can easily be identified, and that this identification is not charged with problematic meanings. That is evidently not the case. First of all, the majority of young migrants studied in the European research project TRESEGY are citizens of their country of residence, as in France and the Netherlands. In some other countries, such as in Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal, some have the nationality others not, some are even illegal residents. Secondly, the majority of the young migrants are so-called 'second-generation' (or some even 'third-generation) migrants, and to designate them as migrants is literally an abuse of language, because many of them are born in the country of residence and have the nationality of this country and they have no plans to emigrate. It is certainly problematic to classify them as 'migrants', because that would mean that a significant part of the population of European societies could be classified as migrant with the same procedure. At best, it could be said that they originate from migrant background, but even such a designation identifies them as descendants of former migrants and entails the problem to encapsulate them into a social group with which they do not necessarily identify. Scientifically speaking, such designations are at least rather problematic. We will return to this question in the discussion. In this paper we will use the terminology 'from migrant background', being aware that even such a qualification can be problematic, when comparing them to their native young counterparts, the descendants of long-term residents of the country in question.

As we are interested in how young persons from migrant background fare in education and labour market participation, it is certainly necessary to consider the conditions of social citizenship. As it is well known, these conditions are not identical in different European countries because there is no common European social policy. Therefore, we have to confront a third awkward question, namely how to compare the results of the investigations in different countries.

Another important reservation has to be made concerning the negative image of the position of young migrants in the European societies. Indeed, current figures indicate that migrant youth are at a disadvantage in the educational and professional spheres compared with their native counterparts. Their disadvantage even increased since the beginning of the economic crisis. According to the OECD (2009) there are large increases in unemployment rates and decreases in employment rates of immigrants. Migrants tend to be harder hit than natives for a number of reasons. Migrants are overrepresented in cyclically sensitive sectors, they have less secure contractual arrangements and they are subject to selective hiring and firing (OECD, 2009). Buchholz et al. (2009) state that the young are the ones that face strong insecurities when entering the labour market and especially the lower qualified amongst them.

However, it is important to nuance this negative image because the debate on segmented assimilation makes it clear that the position of young migrants indicates a tendency towards polarization (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly & Haller, 2005). According to the segmented assimilation theory, migrants adapt to a host society in different ways. One way is successful integration into the host society with or without maintaining one's own cultural heritage (Portes & Zhou, 1993). For instance, in Europe, children of migrants are, generally speaking, performing better in the education system and on the labour market, and are showing signs of upward mobility (Crul & Heering, 2008; de Graaf & van Zenderen, forthcoming; Thomson & Crul, 2007). Heath, Rethon and Kilpi (2008) argue that Europe does not have the same debate over segmented assimilation as the US. Particularly, for the downward assimilation route,

since many guest workers entered at the bottom of European societies and there was no way to go but up. However, there exists a group for which the route towards marginalisation is also a possibility. This group of young migrants have inadequate education, are unemployed, and lack the social resources to overcome institutional barriers like discrimination. The situation of young migrants is polarized and an overall negative image is one-sided.

Having formulated these four reservations and questions, we can now start with presenting the main question that this paper attempts to discuss. It is the question of how young persons of migrant origin experience their life in their country of residence, what problems they confront and what kind of support social policy of their country of residence has to offer to them. Some of them have a status of illegal residents, and that entails that social policy will exclusively offer a very minimal support, such as basic schooling and assistance with life threatening problems. However, for the great majority of them, social citizenship is in principle available to them, with all the diverse meanings of being a (social) citizen.

Social citizenship offers in principle, next to political citizenship, the opportunities to participate fully in the country of residence, without specific hindrance, such as discrimination, for example because of their migrant origin, however far back in time this may be. Moreover, social rights entail the right for equal access to education, health care and the labour market, and for support in cases of life accidents, such as illness, unemployment and old age. These various rights are instituted in all European countries, however, not at all in the same way or to the same degree. Moreover, all European countries have transformed their welfare arrangements in significant ways during the last twenty years, with some convergences but also with many differences among them.

There are two interlinked convergent lines of transformations of welfare arrangements in European countries despite all the disparities that are also evident. Firstly, all these countries are taking part in the present phase of globalization and European integration, and they experience to some extent the same constraints, such as a loss of national independence to define a social policy supported by a monetary policy. Moreover, the rapid increase of trade of manufactured goods, and their production in low wage countries, such as China, has severe consequences for the labour markets of all the European countries. Much more could be said about the influence of globalization, here we limit ourselves to these remarks.

In response to the effects of globalization, the European Union has defined a programme which should guarantee the strength of European economies in the coming years, using the slogan that European countries have to become 'knowledge and service societies'. With the so-called Lisbon Agenda, various aims have been formulated in order to stimulate the realization of this slogan, such as increases of the percentages of persons in higher education, to diminish the number of dropouts from education, higher rates of participation in the labour market, in particular for young people, women and the older population, just to name a few of these aims. In line with the Lisbon agenda activate labour market policies, life long learning, and the change from welfare to workfare have been introduced.

A second type of convergence, linked to the first one, can be identified in the main theme of the ongoing transformations of the welfare arrangements in European countries. The reasoning goes as follows: as globalization entails more flexibility and mobility, new risks will have to be confronted, such as the risk of losing one's job. Buchholz et al. (2009) argue that under globalisation existing employment risks have been intensified. According to them '*globalisation triggers a strengthening of exiting social inequality structures*'. Especially

young adults are the ‘losers’ of globalisation and education and class determines how much individuals face increased labour market risks (Buchholz et al., 2009).

However, these risks can to some extent be tackled by individuals themselves, provided that they are responsible to begin with. Such a responsibility not only entails to pursue a good education and to acquire general competences to be employable in various ways (Lisbon agenda). It also means that one should foresee these life events and prevent to be overwhelmed by them, by engaging early on in personal saving schemes, and in diversified social networks, which could help to engage flexibly in new life projects. In any case, all the transformations of welfare systems in European countries, besides underlining the necessity of long-term sustainability, put forward the accent on personal responsibility for prevention of the new risks. The terminology used to describe these transformations use terms such as ‘social investment policy’ or ‘activation policy’ (Jenson, 2009).

These two convergent lines should not hide the fact that different countries are variously affected by globalization and realize new social policies in different ways. National institutions filter the increasing uncertainty due to globalisation in a specific way, and most countries have different forms of labour market flexibilization, changing life courses and social inequality structures of modern societies in different ways (Buchholz et al., 2009). In most of the countries involved we can diagnose a limited application of these new lines of social policy, however, these policy lines apply certainly to dropouts and to young people involved in the passage from education to work. Concerning young people, some authors identify the tendency of social citizenship becoming more fragile (Castel, 2009, Somers, 2008), others (Bradley and van Hoof, 2005; Buchholz et al., 2009) diagnose the situation of young people in Europe as rather problematic. We will discuss this point more specifically in the conclusion.

We can now formulate our general hypothesis which we will discuss in this paper. Our contention is that the effects of globalization and of the new social policies have far going consequences for young people from migrant origins in European countries, because the general conditions of living and of support for social citizenship are profoundly changing. However, one cannot presume that a transformation of the general conditions affect directly the experiences of young people from migrant origin. Our hypothesis is more nuanced: our target group will be affected in diverse ways by these transformations, and that this diversity of reactions has implications for understanding the situation of these populations.

After a section describing the studies the EU research project TRESEGY, we will present and discuss the relevant results for the issues of this paper. In the conclusion we will interpret these results in the light of the formulated hypothesis.

Method

The EU research project TRESEGY was a sixth framework programme, under the priority theme ‘Citizens and governance in a knowledge based society’, with the title: “Factors of economic, social and cultural in- and exclusion of second-generation migrants in Europe”, starting in June 2006 till May 2009. Six countries participated in the research project, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany and the Netherlands, and nine cities as research locations have been chosen: Rome and Genoa in Italy, Lisbon and Porto in Portugal, Madrid and

Barcelona in Spain, Metz in France, Berlin in Germany and Utrecht in the Netherlands. In each of these cities, one or more neighbourhoods have been chosen, with a significant number of migrant inhabitants.

The research project was conducted in three steps: the first step investigated national and local policies concerning migrants, the second step realized a quantitative study, with 600 respondents in each research location, with in principle a participation of 50 % young migrants and 50 % young natives. The surveys were mostly held in schools. During the third step, an extensive ethnographic study has been realized, involving participant observations, interviews and biographical interviews, etc. Case studies were set up in various local settings like on the street, schools, community centres and workshops for young people. Finally, a transnational comparison has been set up as conclusion for the project.

As can be expected, a variety of migrant groups have been investigated in the various research locations. Mainly youngsters from Turkish origin in Berlin, in Utrecht mainly young persons with a Moroccan origin, in France mainly young persons with a North African origin, in Italy and Spain, next to youngsters from Africa also many with a South American origin came into the picture, and in Portugal, next to descendants from the former African colonies, studies involved also young people with Ukrainian and Chinese origin.

The first step established that the national and local policies vary a lot between these countries and research locations, with some countries having a long tradition of immigrant countries such as France and the Netherlands and others not. Also the availability and quality of statistical data varies enormously between these countries, as does the form taken of the welfare state arrangements.

Relevant results

Survey

To begin with we will present some relevant results from the quantitative study, based on a questionnaire, realized in the nine research locations (Padilla and Scaglione, 2008). In each location, about 600 respondents filled in the questionnaire, with some sixty questions concerning topics related to experiences of social, economical and cultural in- and exclusion like education, identification and discrimination. In general, about half of the respondents are from migrant origin, the others are young 'natives'. The questions are about their origin, the education and income of their parents, their education and work perspectives, their experience with discrimination and their outlook on their future life.

As already specified, a great diversity of groups participated; next to the young natives, there were young persons with a migrant background from Africa, South America, Eastern Europe, China, Turkey. The age of the respondents varies from 15 to 24 years, so there is at least some comparability. Young immigrants having arrived in the host country after their birth constituted the majority of the respondents in Barcelona, Madrid, Genoa and Rome, whereas in the other locations the majority of the respondents was born in the country of residence.

The highest education finished as well as the occupational status of the parents of the young respondents with a migrant background is significantly lower than the level of the parents of their native counterparts. The majority of the young respondents with a migrant background live in rented houses, whereas the majority of the young 'natives' live in houses their parents

own. There are also significant differences concerning ownership of new media, such as computers. The young respondents recognize that there are many problems in the neighbourhood they live, such as racism, violence, delinquency, drugs, insecurity, thefts and vandalism. More troubles are signalled by the young 'natives', which shows that the two groups use different scales of appreciation. However, it is notable that despite these problems the great majority declared that they like to live in their neighbourhoods and do not want to move.

These results are completely in line with outcomes of previous research on the conditions of migrants (OECD 2007).

Concerning friendship and meeting places, the results show clear segregation patterns between the 'native' youth and 'migrant' youth. A difference between them is that the national youth tend to have practically only national friends, while the youth with a migrant background have a majority of their friends from the same ethnic group, but some have also friends from the group of 'natives', in particular because of school. While the family is important for all the young respondents, it is worthwhile to mention that for the young with a migrant background the mother is sensibly more important in the life of her children than in the case of national mothers. Notable is the role of fathers who are hardly consulted for (emotional) support by the youngsters. There is also an interesting result concerning gender differences: boys meet their friends in majority outside, while girls of immigrant origin meet their friends at home.

The TRESEGY survey included several questions on identity, such as on geopolitical identification (European, national, local, other), on self identification (how the youngsters see themselves), on external identification (how others see them) and on spaces of self-identification).

'Native' youth tends to identify with a national, European and local identity, in this order; the only exception was Barcelona, where the Spanish identity has not been mentioned often, because of the Catalan identity. Young persons with a migrant background present a different pattern: a foreign identity is common, followed by a local, national and European one. Only in Metz and in Lisbon the local, national and European identification was stronger than the foreign one.

Concerning the spaces of identification a similar difference is evident: for 'native' youth the order of spaces of identification was first the neighbourhood, followed by the country, the city or Europe, whereas for young persons with a migrant background the country of their parents is first mentioned, followed by the neighbourhood.

Concerning external identification – in other words, the identification that others construct about them – important differences appear between the groups. Among the native respondents, the most important aspects highlighted are age, gender and clothing style, whereas the respondents with a migrant background mention their origin in the first place. Also religion and skin colour are mentioned as important by migrants.

For self-identification 'native' youth mention in the first place gender and clothing style, whereas for the respondents with a migrant background origin and gender are considered as important. In Utrecht, Metz and Berlin (Islamic) religion plays an important role. Indeed, in

these cities, the respondents are from Algeria, Morocco and Turkey. Young Muslims have a stronger religious identity.

Discrimination: 'native' youth recognize a bit more openly the existence of racism than the youth of immigrant origin, however there is a large consensus about the presence of discrimination. The majority of the respondents affirm that there is 'some' (on average 40 % for young 'migrants' and 50 % for young 'natives' or 'a lot' (on average 20 % and 25 %) of racism.

The main reasons of discrimination for 'native' youth are age and clothing style, while among young 'migrants' it is always origin, skin colour and religion. 'Migrant' youngsters feel more often discriminated against than 'native' youngsters. Both groups feel mostly discriminated in schools. Migrants feel also discriminated against in public transportation, shops and bars and in the neighbourhood. For natives the other places vary depending on the city/setting.

Finally, several questions have been included in the questionnaire concerning the expectations and the level of satisfaction of living in the country of residence. The level of satisfaction of living in the country of residence is high for young 'migrants' (between 50 and 60 %) and even higher for 'native' youngsters (between 60 and 70 %), and quite a significant proportion is 'more or less satisfied' (30 and 20 %). Only a tiny minority of 4 to 5 % declare not to be satisfied. There is one exception to this general trend, which is Lisbon: indeed, the neighbourhood and the social prospects where the respondents live are quite problematic.

When asked whether they are satisfied with their life, the majority of all the respondents respond that they are 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied', with a bit more answers of being 'satisfied' by 'native' youngsters, and a bit more answers of being 'a bit satisfied' by young 'migrants' than 'natives'. The answer category 'not satisfied with life' was only used by very few respondents.

Concerning expectations and future projects, a question was included in the survey: "what aspects of your life would you like to see changed next year?". The majority of all the respondents, with no significant differences between the groups, mentioned economic aspects in the first place and in second place studies. In other words, all the respondents would like to have more money to spend, and to pursue with success their studies. Concerning the other answer categories, such as family, work, legal situation, personal relations, wishes to change something were mentioned, but came far behind the two categories 'economic' and 'studies'.

These results are partly congruent with earlier studies, which confirms the validity of the enterprise. Partly, this large study points to some new interesting points. However, before summarizing these points it is necessary to point out limitations of these results. As already stated before, the respondents come from a variety of groups, and moreover, they live in countries with very different systems of social policy and citizenship regimes. Therefore, one has to be careful when interpreting these results.

There are two families of results that have a high degree of similarity, which seems to justify to consider these results as really significant for young populations living in very different regions of Europe and coming from very different origins.

The first family of results shows that the great majority of all young people are satisfied with their life, and that they are also satisfied with the condition of living in their country of

residence. Only a tiny minority is not satisfied. They also have a clear wish for upward mobility: they all feel that compared to their parents their future situation will be better. This general result can be interpreted as an evident sign of strength and resilience of young people of all origins, even within a situation where all of them recognize the existence of clear forms of discrimination, which is a second family of results which are highly similar for all the respondents.

Besides the results which confirm the disadvantages of populations with a migrant background, such as the level of education of parents and the status of their occupation, there are a number of interesting results which are more difficult to interpret.

For example, all the respondents place the family very high as a significant support, but young people with a migrant background mention particularly the role of the mother. Another result shows that Muslim migrant groups, experience discrimination because of their religion. Also, a majority of the young 'migrants' place the country of their parents quite high as a place of identification. These results could be explained in many ways, but one explanation could be that a majority of the populations with a migrant background have on the one hand a different family system than the young 'natives' and on the other hand, that they manifest more than the young 'natives' a sense of belonging to a specific community, which does not exclude the possibility to identify with other young people concerning their style of living and clothing, etc.

In terms of friendship and meeting places of friends, there are some interesting results. The young 'natives' do not seem to mix much with their migrant counterparts, and the same holds for the young 'migrants'. However, there seems to be a significant difference between the behaviour of boys and girls, because girls of migrant origin meet their friends above all at their home, while boys meet them outside, a difference which is much less pronounced for the young native ones. This result seems to confirm the interpretation that they live partly in different family systems. After the presentation of the results of the ethnographic studies we will come back to this question.

Another interesting result concerns living conditions. Generally speaking, young people with a migrant background live more often in segregated and deprived neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods are characterized by a lack of economic and social resources and the young people living there often report a lot of problems like violence, delinquency, drugs and thefts. However, when asked the majority declares they like to live in the neighbourhood and do not want to move (between 65% and 90%). They are even happier or more satisfied with the neighbourhood than the natives. Furthermore, the neighbourhood is also an important space/reference for their sense of identity. The ethnographic studies, as we will later show, revealed that the young people can act and react quite defensively when they feel that their quarter or neighbourhood is negatively depicted in the media or by the police.

Ethnographic studies

The research project TRESEGY has also realized quite intensive ethnographic studies in the nine research locations. In principle, the ethnographic studies have been realized with chosen samples of the respondents involved in the quantitative study, in order to enrich the material and for exploring more in detail the experiences of the youngsters with a migrant background. In all research locations, next to participant observations, interviews have been used, sometimes quite intensive interviews, exploring in detail the biographical aspects and the

future expectations of the interviewees. However, as an ethnographic methodology has to be adapted to local circumstances, and as these vary a lot, there is even a greater problem of comparability of the results. Therefore, we will present here only some of the most relevant results for the present discussion. Furthermore, despite the successful execution of the ethnographic studies there was an important limitation. In many cases with the help of the institutions contacts with the young people were established. This has influenced heavily the interactions, how the researchers were perceived by the young people and how they reacted on them. For instance, due to the collaboration with a school, the members of the Dutch team were associated with this institution and were perceived as teachers by the migrants students. This limitation should be taken into account.

An overview of all the results can be found in the public documents published on the TRESEGY site (www.tresegy.eu), in particular the summary report of the ethnographic studies (Gerritsen et.al. 2009).

The most interesting and also in a sense very banal result of the ethnographic studies is that the great majority of young migrants situate themselves practically in the country of residence, with the exception of Rome and to some extent Lisbon. This can be explained by the fact that in Rome, young 'migrants' have arrived recently and are more or less 'forced' by their parents to migrate. In Lisbon, the target group are long-term migrants from Africa, living in difficult circumstances with a lot of experienced discrimination. But generally speaking the perception of young people with a migrant background is: It is here we live, it is here that we want to develop a future, it is here that we experience our hopes and our difficulties. Almost none of them speak about re-emigrating to the country of origin, and only a few express the hope to include in their further life and career a stretch of (professional) activity in their country of origin. Quite a few affirm quite explicitly that when they pass some time in their country of origin, they have to pass through a phase of "integration" in the original culture, which is not at all easy for them.

The fact that the young migrants situate themselves in the country of residence becomes evident through a number of outcomes of the ethnographic studies. First of all, all of them acknowledge that an education and a good work experience is a pre-condition for realizing a suitable professional and personal life in the country of residence. Such an acknowledgement presupposes indeed that they see their future in this country. Other reasons supporting such a statement can be found in the results that for example in Utrecht young Moroccan boys defend 'their' neighbourhood, 'their' meeting spaces and 'their' rights. They are in general rather proud of their neighbourhood, and even the groups perceived by official institutions (such as the police or the municipality) as rather problematic, defend the name and the quality of their neighbourhood; they rather see it defamed by the media and by local police or local and national politicians. The same hold for Metz. Critical voices about their way of behaving or of forming associations (either as a family, a community or a group of friends) are rather sharply and sometimes violently rejected. Such a rejection also presupposes as evidence the fact that they see their roots in the country of residence, and that they defend the rights to organize themselves as they want.

A second general result of the ethnographic studies, which extends the former point, is that the young migrants are in general rather optimistic about their future opportunities in the country of residence; a result which is in line with the results of the survey. All of them expect that they will be better off in their future life than their parents. This again points to a strong wish for upward mobility and to the expectation that such a wish can be realized. They acknowledge explicitly (or implicitly in case of failure) that they are in a situation that enables

them to develop interesting future perspectives, either through education or through the opportunities to set up an independent business or small work place. And they all know examples of other migrants who have indeed realized such opportunities. They know that some of their private dreams will be difficult to realize. However, in general, their hopes are not always realistic and in line with their present engagement in education or work experience. Moreover, some of them nuance the optimism by mentioning forms of discrimination or a lack of resources. For instance, due to discrimination and limited access to proper jobs and education the youth of African decent in Lisbon feels deprived and are pessimistic about their future prospects. However, in general, it is not only the society of the country of residence that is sometimes perceived as constraining the realization of their expectations, also their families and their community is perceived as a constraining force, in particular in the migrant populations originating in Morocco, Turkey and Algeria, with a Muslim background. This result is in a way quite paradoxical, because in all other discussions they all defend with hands and feet their community and their way of living. Critical voices from 'others' are immediately seen as 'paternalistic' or even as imposing orders, which have to be rejected directly.

This brings us to a third general result, which is really interesting, because it reveals a profound dilemma of the young migrants. We have already indicated that they situate themselves in general in the country of residence, and expect that their future will be better than the life of their parents. However, they seem to perceive themselves very strongly as a group, and also in their behaviour they associate almost exclusively with members of their community. This holds above all for Moroccans, but also for Turkish and Algerian young migrants, and in a different way for the young Latin American youngsters. Practically they do not 'sit' or 'work' with 'native' youngsters in school neither during lessons nor during breaks. And on the street, in particular migrant young boys associate almost exclusively with members from the same community of origin. They also compare themselves with their parents and not with other residents of the country of residence. And when speaking about future husbands or spouses, the great majority says to want a partner from the same community. Such a perception and attitude does not appear at all as a dilemma to the young migrants encountered during the ethnographic studies; while on the other hand, they identify the family and the community as constraining forces either by obliging them to migrate or by imposing norms and forms of conduct. Expectations by families, for instance, can be constraining for migrant young people in Lisbon: girls have care responsibility (often at home) and boys are expected to work and earn money for the family. However, in the case of girls it also shows that mothers often support them to finish their education.

A fourth general result is that in some research locations (Metz, Utrecht and Berlin and to some extent Genoa) young migrants (at least our target group) identify themselves as Muslims, and this identification contributes to perceive themselves as an "us" opposed to "them", the other residents of the country of residence. Moreover, being Muslim means also for them a way of life and conduct, and, moreover, religion can offer significant networks for them. However, a perception of "us" and "them" is for example also very strong in Rome, and therefore, also applies in some cases to youngsters with non-Muslim migrant backgrounds.

A fifth result concerns discrimination. Young migrant populations distinguish more or less explicitly two forms of discrimination. Firstly, some of them feel as viewed as 'different' by the native populations, either because of their skin colour (such as in Lisbon) or because of their ambiguous status (as having no or only a limited residence permit). Secondly, all of the young migrants experience a different form of discrimination, which can be described as more

cultural. Because of their names, or their language proficiency, or their living conditions, or religious habits, they feel that they encounter prejudices from the native populations (as well in the street, but mainly when looking for a job). These prejudices concern in general their supposed 'ethnic' characteristics.

The young migrants do quite frequently mention discrimination, and when asked explicitly, they all affirm to have been victim of discrimination or that they expect that discrimination might play a role when trying to find a suitable job. For example, quite a number of young Muslim women, wearing a head scarf, anticipate that this practice might be a problem for them when looking for a job. It is remarkable that above all the marginal groups of young migrants (dropouts or street gangs) are much more explicit about discrimination: they feel harassed by the police, by camera observations and depicted in a negative way by the press.

This last point brings us to some of the variations that our case studies revealed. Whereas the young migrants involved in education or work are rather defensive to use the terminology of discrimination, the marginal ones (in terms of schooling or work) refer almost exclusively to such a terminology. The communication with them is almost limited to a kind of collective "self-defence" against presumed (and certainly partly real) instances of harassment and discrimination. Therefore, it was rather impossible to interview individuals of this group, because of their strong apprehension of prejudices we as researchers might share with the police, the media, etc. To agree to be interviewed is rather seen as a give away or as a betrayal of the group.

Another very significant variation concerns the differences of behaviour and attitudes of boys and girls. Young migrant women are apparently more open for contacts (this is what they affirm when asked), however, it was impossible in our case studies to get a clear picture of how this is realized. Young male migrants, on the contrary, associate quite openly with each other, and confirm explicitly that they have above all male friends from the same ethnic background. Also at school, migrant boys and girls do not mix a lot. Migrant boys do in general not meet at their homes (most of them live with their families), but outside in the neighbourhood and on the street. They are therefore, more visible in the public sphere and more often confronted with discriminatory behaviour.

The ethnographic studies permit us to advance a bit more in the interpretation of the results. All the other groups investigated affirm a strong attachment to their family and their community. However, there are evident differences: the Chinese migrants in Porto, for example, having in general a higher education, engage in lots of contacts outside their community, and the same holds to some degree for the Ukrainian migrants. The families and communities constitute a strong point of reference, as well for identification and for forming networks, but are also to some extent seen as constraining the opportunities of the younger ones.

This outcome is at least partially in conflict with the general desire to construct a future in the country of residence, which is the case for the large majority of the young with a migrant background investigated. They feel quite satisfied with their life and with the condition of living in the country of residence. And they know that they will have to finish a 'good' education and make efforts to realize their future expectations. However, because they are in general involved mainly in networks with members of their own community, with the norms and habits which hold in these communities, they are to some extent at odds with the norms and values of the host society, where in general a different family system is dominant (with a

more equal distribution of gender roles and power relations, based on negotiations). This is particularly true for young girls with a migrant background, and still more heavily for those with a Muslim religion.

Conclusion and discussion

All European countries, despite many differences, are active participants of the process of globalization, with the consequences of a new international division of labour and increased streams of goods, capital and services circulated in the world. The circulation of individuals is partly stimulated in this process, in particular inside the EU, however there are definite limitations for immigration from other countries, except highly qualified professionals. As we already stated in the introduction, the process of globalization limits the independence of specific countries to define their own economic and social policy. One country alone cannot for example engage on its own in a Keynesian policy, a lesson that France learned under president Mitterand.

The process of globalization entails also new risks, and a whole literature about these new risks has seen the day, starting with the publication in 1992 of the book 'risk society' (Beck, 1992), followed by many others (Beck, 2000, Giddens et.al. 2006, Giddens, 2007). The conviction has been formulated that these new risks can partly be anticipated and prevented by individual members of European societies, through a new type of responsibility of constructing one's own potentialities, for example through education, through being prepared for flexible employability and with the help of judicious savings.

These challenges have been explicitly confronted by the EU, on the one hand by the goals formulated in the Lisbon agenda, and on the other hand by formulating a new social policy, based on activation. The goals of the Lisbon agenda include a better preparation of children for education through early and pre-school education, a reduction of the number of dropouts from education, an increase of the rate of participation in the labour market, in particular for young and older persons and for women and to create a more flexible work force by means of life long learning. The new social policy, called 'social investment policy', or 'activation policy' is conceptually systematically elaborated, but has not been translated systematically into policy practice in the same way in the various European countries. However, concerning young people, policy measures have been adopted in all countries.

Let us now discuss more in detail the new type of risks our target group has to confront. We will use here a distinction between three types of risks, introduced by Castel (2003). Castel argues that the inflationary use of the general concept of 'risk' after the publication of Beck's work in 1992, does not stimulate serious scientific studies, Castel suggests to distinguish between three configurations of risks, which are very different from each other. Firstly, the social risks; these are the risks identified and taken into account, mainly through guaranteed assurance schemes (Ewald, 1986) by the construction of welfare states, roughly during the last century, such as work accidents, illness, etc. Here belongs for example unemployment. The process of globalization has without any doubts modified the configuration of this family of social risks.

A second family of risks, Castel has identified, is constituted by the discursive and political construction of the concept of 'groups at risk', in other words, groups of persons, identified as a social group by common characteristics which threaten to push these groups into a marginal

of more or less excluded position. Here belong for example the ‘young’, the ‘low educated’, the ‘single-parent-families’ (mostly women), the ‘older males’ (often alcoholic, threatened to lose their job and their family ties) and also ‘migrant populations’. In all these cases, risk factors have been identified, which permit to anticipate an awkward event in the future, which is considered more or less probable due to the combination of factors. Therefore, it seems necessary to supervise and check constantly whether or not the awkward event is going to happen. Such a procedure can be effective, because there is certainly nothing wrong with prevention, however, the possibility does exist to objectify social groups in this way, with very problematic consequences. That seems to be the case with migrant populations. Before discussing this question, we only mention the third family of risks distinguished by Castel, which comprises the awkward and problematic consequences of the unwanted effects of scientific and technical developments and from the exploitation of natural resources of the planet earth.

Migrant populations have been identified as a ‘group at risk’ in European societies during the last decades due to the conjunction of several, quite distinct categories of risk factors. The first one, has already been mentioned in the introduction, which are the so-called disadvantages of migrants in terms of education, language proficiency, participation in the labour market, etc. These disadvantages have been confirmed by many studies, however, it is worth mentioning that these disadvantages decrease on average over time, and they are quite different for the various groups of migrants as becomes clear in the debate on segmented assimilation. Also youngsters in general have been formulated as a group at risk, which makes the young from a migrant background a group that is at double risk.

A second category of risk factors has been identified as the ‘traditional’ or ‘pre-modern’ family structure of the majority of migrant groups, with, in general, a deficit of emancipation of women of these populations, in particular in migrant groups with Muslim religion. The main attention of social policy and of integration policy in EU countries is concerned with the emancipation of women. This second category of factors of risk is sometimes called a ‘cultural’ one, denoting the cultural distance between the migrant groups and the host society. Here belong also the supposed or real differences of norms and values, in particular the norms of socialization and child raising, which is judged in many countries as insufficient for preparing young children in a suitable way for primary education. Another example is the conviction that young migrants due to their cultural or ethnic background lack the appropriate social skills for entering the labour market successfully.

A third category of factors that has been identified is the disproportionately high percentage of migrants, and in particular of young migrants, among the offenders, coming in contact with the police and being brought before a judge. In popular terms, these are the cases of disturbance of public order, of theft, drug dealing and other criminal activities which are brought together within this third factor of risk. Finally, a fourth category of risk factors is terrorism. Indeed, there have been terrorist attacks in various European countries, such as Spain, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and quite a few others, and also some apparently serious attempts of realizing such attacks. The generally young terrorists are predominantly Muslims. This last factor of risk certainly is present, some have called it the ‘home-grown terrorists’ (Buijs, et.al.).

These four categories of risk factors, which are quite heterogeneous, have been combined during the last two decades in order to construct this new ‘group at risk’. This power of this construction should not be underestimated, because it has been translated and widely used in public space and in policy debates. Moreover, it is, often in exaggerated ways, a central part

of the discourse used by new right and populist political parties and movements in European countries.

Scientifically speaking, the combination of these four categories of risk factors can be easily rejected. Indeed, these four categories are first of all quite heterogeneous, there is no inherent linkage between the four categories. Secondly, some of these categories apply, and then only partly, to specific groups of migrant populations, such as Muslims. Thirdly, another category, the threat of terrorism, while being real, applies only to a tiny fraction of young persons with a migrant background. Finally, quite a number of persons with a migrant background cannot be subsumed under any of these four categories of risk factors.

Nonetheless, it appears, that the research project TRESEGY has established that disadvantages do exist, and that it seems that in many cases of the youngster with a migrant background live in families which do not conform to the new normative model of post modern families promoted in European countries. Indeed, the goals of the Lisbon agenda and the new ideals of social policy promote a family model, based on the idea of independent men and women, both with a good education and engaged in the labour market, who share the task of bringing up children with the help of paid assistance, and who negotiate on an equal basis the daily tasks of running a household. This model has been called the ‘adult worker model family’ (Lewis and Guillari, 2006). Such a normative model has only been realized very sparingly in European countries. Indeed, investigations have established that the majority of women choose a so-called ‘neo-traditional’ behaviour when being engaged in a household with children (Born, 2003). This terminology points to the pre-dominant model of family life, sometimes called 1 ½ households, or to the situations that women after giving birth to a child modify consistently their engagement in the labour market. Still, it seems, that quite a number of the families of the persons with a migrant background, live in family systems and communities that are at some distance from the ‘neo-traditional’ behaviour of women. This became evident through the indications of the ‘valuation’ of the role of the mother, and from the reported impression that young persons experience constraints from their families and their community. However, this statement remains a schematic affirmation, because much more detailed research on specific issues is needed to specify more seriously the situation of the households of persons with a migrant background.

It is time to summarize and to discuss the general hypothesis of this paper. Concerning the groups in European societies with a migrant background, and in particular young ones, their conditions of life have changed because of three developments affecting these conditions. Firstly, globalization has changed in significant ways the conditions of the labour market and in particular the opportunities for lower educated groups which has consequences for all the residents of European countries. However, because of the disadvantages of our target group, this group will be more affected by this development. Secondly, a new social policy is being developed, with a definite accent on personal responsibility for one’s life course in terms of employability and financial resources. This new social policy is only partly realized in practice, but has definite effects on young persons who are at the margin, because of dropping out, or having an insufficient education. This new social policy is as such quite interesting, however it presupposes a solid guaranteed support in order to be able to take on these new responsibilities. The question is whether this is the case with our target group; a certain doubt about this is realistic because the support guaranteed by social policy becomes more conditional with this new policy, and threatens to erode the substantial character of social support formerly guaranteed. That is why Somers (2009) diagnoses social citizenship as becoming more fragile. Thirdly, ‘migrant populations’ have been constructed as a group at

risk. This operation has many effects, and in particular the effect that this group at risk will be supervised more thoroughly than before. All together, these three lines of development entail that the conditions of life for our target group are more fragile. One could fear, given these developments that a growing 'dualisation' of European societies is under way (Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009) and that indeed globalisation triggers strengthening of social inequality structures in modern societies (Buchholz et al., 2009). This seems justified when one takes into account the fact that entry positions (in case an 'entry' takes place) in the labour market have durable effects on further careers, in particular in Germany and Italy.

It is altogether astonishing that the results of our research show a widely shared optimism of youngster with a migrant background. They are in majority quite satisfied with the conditions of life in their country of residence, they see their future in this country and they think that they will be better off than their parents. These results show that the transformation of the general conditions of life and of social citizenship do not affect directly the experiences and the expectations of our target group. On the contrary, they manifest a high degree of resilience and of optimism. Their choice of life is clearly inspired by what can be called a multicultural perspective, or in other words, the recognition to adapt to the host country (for example concerning education and the criteria of participation in the labour market), however, by far not all of them do succeed to realize these aims, while at the same time defending partly the lifestyle of their community. To some extent, one can understand this appreciation by the fact that the members of our target group compare themselves in the first place with their parents and other members of their community. And in majority they are probably right: they will have a better future than their parents had, and their conditions of life are far better than the conditions in the country of origin of their parents. However, we can also conclude, that they do not appreciate fully all the consequences of the ongoing transformations of the conditions of life and of social citizenship. Therefore, it can be expected that the tension between the changed conditions and the registered optimism will produce a multitude of reactions and of life experiences of the young from migrant background, which goes in the direction of the thesis of segregated assimilation..

The thesis of segmented assimilation entails that the situation of youngsters with a migrant background is polarized: for some groups of migrant youngsters the situation is indeed not improving or even getting worse, such as for dropouts and unemployed, but instead of overall downward mobility for most migrant youngsters the situation is clearly improving. This is reflected in the optimistic and motivated attitude of many youngsters in the TRESEGY study. The results correspond to what is referred to in an recent American study as 'the second generation advantage' (Kasinitz et al, 2008). Second generation migrants display a lot of ambition and will for upward mobility. They want to establish this by means of integration into the (host)society through their education or work but at the same by maintaining their own culture (strategy of selective acculturation). This way they will more and more end up in middle class society. Moreover, they can profit from living in 'two (cultural) worlds. This entails (cultural) creativity and enables them to cope with different and sometimes conflicting norms and expectations. For instance, the TRESEGY study showed that some young migrant girls who have less access to the public sphere, like the street and neighbourhood, are spending more time at home are more focussed on educational achievements. Another example is migrant youth of African descent in Lisbon. On the one hand the awareness of their skin colour is a source for exclusion by native groups who perceive them as African and thus as outsiders. On the other hand their African characteristics are important for identification and bonding with other young migrants which is expressed through clothing style, food, music and dance.

In short, the young from a migrant background, follow a diversity of life paths, and their resilience and optimism can in many cases help to overcome the tensions they have to confront.

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